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Dollar Unilateralism: 
The New Frontline of National Security 
SUZANNE KATZENSTEIN* 
This Article makes three points. First, it draws attention to a profound shift 
toward “dollar unilateralism” by the U.S. government as it advances core national 
security goals. Relying on the special status of the U.S. dollar, the government has 
enlisted foreign banks to isolate targeted entities and track illicit financial flows. 
Second, drawing on examples such as Iran’s nuclear program, the Article identifies 
three formal and informal legal tactics the government has used to implement 
dollar unilateralism: financial sticks, high-profile blacklists, and direct diplomacy. 
Finally, the Article discusses the efficacy of dollar unilateralism and its 
implications for U.S. accountability. Dollar unilateralism challenges a 
conventional view about the inevitability of multilateral cooperation, and is a 
compelling strategy under three conditions. It also, however, presents new gaps in 
U.S. political accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has enlisted a range of domestic private and 
international governmental actors to advance its counterterrorism and nuclear 
nonproliferation objectives. At the domestic level, the United States has relied on 
corporate participants in surveillance operations, such as PRISM1 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Research Scholar and Project Director, Kenan Institute for Ethics. For helpful 
comments, I am grateful to Diane Amann, Lawrence Baxter, Joseph Blocher, Jamie Boyle, 
Curt Bradley, Rachel Brewster, Al Brophy, Guy Charles, John Coyle, Chris Griffin, Lisa 
Griffin, Larry Helfer, Maggie Lemos, Marin Levy, Ann Lipton, Eric Lorber, Ralf Michaels, 
Peter Katzenstein, the Duke junior faculty summer workshop, and the ASIL-SE Junior Senior 
Workshop. I am indebted to Rachel Evans and Ben Oster for their superb research assistance, 
and I thank Joseph Dugan, Joseph Stephens, and members of the Indiana Law Journal for their 
editorial assistance. All errors are mine alone. 
 1. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of 
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Xkeyscore,2 to gain access to data on telephone calls and emails involving both 
U.S. citizens and foreigners. Domestic law scholars have offered probing 
accounts of these programs, concentrating on their constitutional and normative 
implications.3 In the international arena, the United States has turned to 
international organizations, including the United Nations (U.N.) and the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) to implement anti–money laundering and 
counterterrorist financing policies. International law scholars have offered cogent 
analyses of these policies, focusing especially on their implications for human 
rights and international cooperation more generally.4 
Lost in a gap between the domestic and international law literatures is a 
significant shift in government strategy—that is, the government’s attempt to enlist 
foreign banks, not simply domestic firms or foreign governments, to pursue vital 
national security goals. More specifically, the government has turned to foreign 
banks to advance two core security objectives: stopping the financing of terrorism 
and nuclear proliferation (“cutting off the financial pipeline”) and collecting 
financial data to identify illicit networks (“following the money”). While the 
government has previously used economic statecraft—such as trade embargoes and 
export controls—to shape the incentives of foreign firms, this is the first time it has 
ever deployed its current strategy of using its financial power to influence foreign 
banks with the goal of isolating targeted countries and entities. 
The government’s harnessing of foreign banks opens the door to a new form of 
unilateralism, which this Article terms “dollar unilateralism.”5 Dollar unilateralism 
occurs when the government uses the unique status of the U.S. dollar in global 
financial markets to pursue policy goals independently, rather than work through 
                                                                                                                 
Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 6, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 2. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does on 
the Internet,” GUARDIAN (U.K.) (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world
/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data. 
 3. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011); Amitai Etzioni, The 
Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929 (2012); Jon D. 
Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on 
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, All the President’s Spies]; 
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317 (2008); Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and 
Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 191 (2011); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: 
First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008). 
 4. E.g., Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving 
the Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 1 (2008); Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s 
Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 203 (2007). 
 5. This Article emphasizes the procedural dimension of unilateralism and adopts a 
definition used by other scholars. As Monica Hakimi writes, “A state acts unilaterally when 
it does not channel through a formal international process the decision to act.” Monica 
Hakimi, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 111 (2014); see also W. 
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive 
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3, 3 (2000). 
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traditional inter-governmental and multilateral channels. This new strategy, deployed 
for national security objectives, raises a host of more specific questions: How precisely 
is the government able to harness foreign banks, including those without ties to the 
United States? Why do foreign banks cooperate with the government’s strategy, 
especially when they are under no legal obligation to do so? What are the implications 
of this shift in security strategy for future U.S. policy and U.S. accountability? 
This Article suggests that the government elicits cooperation from foreign 
banks, including those with weak or no ties to the United States, by deploying three 
tactics that fall along a continuum of legal formality: financial sticks, high-profile 
blacklists, and direct diplomacy. Financial sticks are the most formal and 
conventional of the three tools. They are congressional or executive measures that 
impose obligations on U.S. actors, but with the goal of pressuring foreign banks. As 
defined in this Article, high-profile blacklists involve the naming of entities or 
regions as potentially engaging in illicit conduct but without imposing obligations 
on U.S. financial actors. These are semiformal legal measures given that they are 
authorized as the first step under section 311 of the Patriot Act,6 but do not require 
U.S. banks to take any measures (this legal directive occurs at the optional second 
step). Still, for material and reputational reasons, the government expects such 
blacklists to make not only U.S. but also foreign banks reduce their business with 
the named entities. Finally, the government, specifically the Treasury Department, 
has employed a systematic campaign that this Article terms “direct diplomacy.” In 
an effort to persuade foreign banks to implement U.S. policy, high-ranking U.S. 
officials meet with foreign bank executives directly rather than attempt to influence 
them indirectly through interactions with their governments. This is the most 
informal of the three tactics; although Treasury can point to congressional statutes 
and executive orders granting it authority to take diplomatic action, these sources 
do not explicitly enumerate Treasury’s responsibilities to engage in diplomacy but 
instead invest Treasury with broad discretionary powers. Treasury’s use of direct 
diplomacy, moreover, does not involve imposing legal obligations on any actors. 
Foreign banks appear to cooperate with U.S. harnessing policies for a variety of 
reasons, including avoiding government scrutiny and heavy fines, preserving their 
access to the U.S. financial market (and with it, U.S. currency), and minimizing the 
reputational risks of being associated directly or indirectly with a U.S.-targeted actor. 
They may cooperate for less material reasons as well, including out of a wave of 
international support and empathy in the aftermath of terrorism, or out of professional 
and social incentives that emerge from interacting with powerful U.S. officials. 
To illustrate these harnessing tactics, this Article draws on three examples: Iran’s 
nuclear program and its support of U.S.-designated terrorist groups, North Korea’s 
nuclear proliferation policy, and intelligence collection by the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgian-incorporated 
telecommunication consortium of private banks. In the first two cases, the 
government’s main goal has been to recruit foreign banks to help cut off the financial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 311, 115 Stat. 272, 298 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2012)). 
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pipeline to terrorists and nuclear proliferators. In the third case, the government 
enlisted SWIFT officials to gain access to troves of financial data. 
The government’s dollar unilateralism challenges the important assumption held 
by many, though not all, international legal scholars that globalization has rendered 
the need for multilateral cooperation among states more pressing than ever before.7 
The increasing integration of the global economy, the rise of both licit and illicit 
transnational networks, and profound technological change have, this view holds, 
undermined the capacity of states to unilaterally regulate activity within their own 
borders.8 The analysis here suggests instead that the U.S. government’s leveraging 
of its central position in global financial markets is likely to persist.9 
Indeed, as the United States confronts new national security challenges, dollar 
unilateralism may well become routine policy. Treasury, as one journalist writes, 
has become “Obama’s favorite noncombatant command.”10 The continued 
availability of unilateralism as a policy option for the United States points to a need 
to understand the conditions that influence its efficacy. This Article proposes three 
such conditions: industry structure, policy acceptability, and bargaining asymmetry.  
This Article also contends that the harnessing of foreign banks raises questions 
about the government’s political accountability, both domestically and 
internationally, that are generally overlooked by both domestic and international 
law literatures. These accountability concerns vary according to context (domestic 
or international) and the nature of the government’s legal tactic (formal or 
informal). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which oversees 
Treasury’s policy on sanctions (broadly defined) is, as one national security expert 
puts it, “probably one of the most powerful government agencies no one’s ever 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See, e.g., Kevin J. Cloherty & Jill L. Brenner, Targeting Terror Dollars: Some 
Lessons from the Drug War, 7 ANDREWS BANK & LENDER LIABILITY LIT. REP. 5 (2001); 
Stewart Patrick, Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. 
Ambivalence, in MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT 1 
(Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and 
Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004); Richard B. 
Stewart, Michael Oppenheimer & Bryce Rudyk, Building Blocks for Global Climate 
Protection, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341 (2013); Brian Wilson, Submersibles and Transnational 
Criminal Organizations, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 46–47 (2011). 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD O’BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF 
GEOGRAPHY (1992); Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets 
Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 266 (2000) (“[G]lobalization finds its strongest expression 
in global capital markets.”); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of 
Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?, 8 CONSTELLATIONS 442, 447 (2001). 
 9. For additional support, see, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: 
Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 789, 790 (2009) 
(“[S]everal innovative aspects of these sanctions . . . seem highly likely to be replicated in 
the design of a wide range of future sanctions against other targets.”); David D. Aufhauser, 
Terrorist Financing: The Privatization of Economic Sanctions, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 22, 
26 (stating that U.S. financial restrictions against Iran represent “a harbinger of future 
models of conduct”); Baran Han, A Theory of Economic Sanctions 27 (Korea Inst. for Int’l 
Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012). 
 10. David E. Sanger, Obama Policy Is Put to Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2014, at A1. 
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heard of.”11 For some actors, this newfound power comes at a price. Even when 
conservatively deployed, dollar unilateralism has unintended humanitarian 
consequences. For instance, in response to the government’s use of financial 
leverage, European banks have shut down many money-transfer businesses that 
they identified as posing money-laundering risks. The reverberations of this 
decision are felt acutely in Africa, where money transfers from the global diaspora 
serve as “an economic lifeline” for millions of Africans.12 Forty percent of Somalis, 
for instance, depend on such transfers.13 
Part I introduces domestic and international law scholarship on the 
government’s post-9/11 national security policies and highlights the recent shift in 
government strategy. It underscores how this harnessing strategy differs from its 
predecessors, and it poses the Article’s two central questions about how the 
government is able to enlist the cooperation of foreign banks and why foreign 
banks are willing to cooperate. Part II answers these questions, arguing that the 
government has used three main tactics and that foreign banks have cooperated for 
a set of diverse reasons. Part III suggests the conditions influencing the efficacy of 
this new model of unilateralism and identifies emerging gaps in U.S. 
accountability, both domestically and globally. 
I. THE TURN TO FOREIGN BANKS AFTER 9/11 
With a few exceptions, both domestic and international law scholars have 
overlooked the government’s turn to dollar unilateralism.14 Domestic law scholars 
have analyzed surveillance programs that depend on the cooperation of domestic 
corporations. Many international law scholars have focused primarily on the 
government’s reliance on international organizations and transgovernmental 
networks and assumed this multilateralism to be increasingly necessary to fight 
cross-border threats.15 Although a small group of international law scholars has 
acknowledged the persistence of unilateralism and debated its normative value, 
these scholars have generally overlooked this shift to a new form of unilateralism, 
which leverages U.S. financial power. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Anna Yukhananov & Warren Strobel, After Success on Iran, U.S. Treasury’s Sanctions 
Team Faces New Challenges, REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com
/article/2014/04/15/us-usa-sanctions-insight-idUSBREA3D1O820140415. 
 12. Let Them Remit, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news
/middle-east-and-africa/21581995-western-worries-about-money-laundering-are-threatening
-economic-lifeline. 
 13. Id.; see also EDWINA THOMPSON, ROBIN PLUMMER, KEITH SENTIS, MICHAEL 
CATALANO, JOHN THOMPSON & TOM KEATINGE, BEECHWOOD INT’L, SAFER CORRIDORS: 
RAPID ASSESSMENT (2013).  
 14. For exceptions, see Kittrie, supra note 9, at 815 n.119; PETER D. FEAVER & ERIC B. 
LORBER, LEGATUM INSTITUTE, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 27 (2010). 
 15. See infra Part I.A.  
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A. Harnessing in Domestic and International Arenas 
The United States has sought to curb cross-border threats by recruiting 
domestic corporate actors and working with foreign governments bilaterally and 
through international organizations and transgovernmental networks. 
Domestically, the government—specifically the Executive16—has, among other 
activities,17 enlisted private companies to collect intelligence.18 Warrantless 
wiretapping (exposed in 2005),19 the “call-tracking program” (uncovered in 
2006),20 PRISM (exposed in 2013),21 and Xkeyscore initiatives (revealed in 
2013)22 are among the better-known examples of public-private surveillance 
operations.23 But the Executive has also launched lower-profile intelligence 
operations, relying on delivery services such as Federal Express (“FedEx”) to 
access databases on international shipments,24 airlines to obtain passenger 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. This Article uses the term “Executive” to refer generally to the executive branch of 
government, which includes Treasury but also encapsulates other agencies (e.g. the NSA). 
 17. Beyond its surveillance efforts, the government’s most salient use of private actors 
in the post-9/11 period is its outsourcing security to private security contractors (PSCs) for 
military interventions and covert antiterrorist operations. Although the government has long 
used PSCs, its reliance on them after 9/11 reached unprecedented levels. Martha Minow, 
Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, 
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1003 (2005); see also LAURA A. 
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF 
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011); P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). For a survey of PSC involvement in military 
engagements, see Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, 
and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1018–40 (2004) 
[hereinafter Michaels, Beyond Accountability]. 
 18. In addition to relying on private companies for covert surveillance operations, the 
government has made extensive use of commercial data brokers to collect information on 
individuals, which is then analyzed by government officials. E.g., Etzioni, supra note 3, at 
934–37; Slobogin, supra note 3, at 320. Private companies have also been heavily involved 
in fusion centers, in which state agencies and law enforcement agencies at both the federal 
and state level coordinate efforts to collect and analyze intelligence. Citron & Pasquale, 
supra note 3, at 1449–50. 
 19. James Risen & Eric Lichtbau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 20. E.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls; 3 
Telecoms Help Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA TODAY, May 11, 
2006, at 1A. 
 21. E.g., Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 1. 
 22. E.g., Greenwald, supra note 2. 
 23. E.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 62, 63–64 (2013). 
 24. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 
1450, 1463–64 (2010) [hereinafter Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security]; Robert Block, 
Private Eyes: In Terrorism Fight, Government Finds a Surprising Ally: FedEx, WALL ST. J., 
May 26, 2005, at A1. 
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information,25 and U.S. financial institutions such as Bank of America26 to access 
vast repositories of private financial data.27 
Scholars have identified both functional and politically strategic reasons for the 
government’s increased reliance on domestic firms. They suggest that private 
companies are both cheaper and better positioned to collect intelligence on private 
activities than government officials because companies interact more frequently 
with the public and in ways that often require the sharing of private information.28 
In terms of strategic benefits, private actors are legally and politically less 
constrained than the government.29 By relying on such companies for intelligence, 
the Executive can benefit from a weak regime regulating corporate privacy while 
avoiding the political costs associated with “big brother” watchdog programs.30 
As in the literature on privatization more generally,31 domestic law scholars 
have raised concerns about executive aggrandizement and accountability.32 Some 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. E.g., Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Screening Plans Went Beyond Terrorism, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, at N35; Secure Flight Compared to CAPPS II, ACLU (Mar. 29, 
2005), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/secure-flight-compared-capps-ii; The Four 
Biggest Problems with the “Secure Flight” Airline Security Program, ACLU (Mar. 24, 2005), 
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/four-biggest-problems-secure-flight-airline
-security-program. 
 26. ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 20–21 (2004), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs
/surveillance_report.pdf [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX]. 
 27. See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, 
AND LIBERTY 164–65 (2008); David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to 
War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1409–18 (2007). 
 28. Minow, supra note 17, at 1003–04; see also Donald G. Featherstun, D. Whitney 
Thornton II & J. Gregory Correnti, State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 648 (2001) (explaining the privatization of government functions more 
generally); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2003) (same). By relying on private data gathering, the government 
avoids the burden of intelligence gathering and focuses instead on analysis. SURVEILLANCE 
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2. By enlisting private contractors, the government 
can also evade certain bureaucratic procedures such as the APA’s notice and comment 
procedures, Michaels, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 1038, and can select 
contractors already trained in recent innovative technologies, rather than conducting the 
training itself. Minow, supra note 17, at 1003–04. 
 29. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 908–09. The ACLU makes the same 
point, but more bluntly: “[This strategy] allows the government to carry out privacy-invading 
practices at ‘arm’s length’ . . . it could not carry out [such tasks] itself without serious legal or 
political repercussions.” SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2. 
 30. See, e.g., SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 29–31; Michaels, 
All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 908–09. 
 31. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2001); Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” Constitutional 
Accountability, and Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1365–67 (2013). 
 32. Academic work on recent surveillance operations has focused on other 
constitutional dimensions as well, including the constitutionality of government-corporate 
data mining initiatives. For privacy rights generally, see Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
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scholars have highlighted a “doctrinal vacuum,” noting that the Supreme Court has 
never ruled on the status of the government’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) 
or its mining of data provided by third parties.33 Others have highlighted 
institutional gaps.34 Surveillance programs like Xkeyscore, for instance, proceed 
largely unchecked by Congress and the courts.35 The covertness of such programs 
eliminates, for all practical purposes, the possibility of external monitoring. 
Intelligence agencies do not carry the burden of justifying their programs to 
outsiders and are not deterred by the possibility that their operations will be 
subjected to some form of ex post political or judicial review.36 
Scholars have devoted less attention to the question of precisely how the 
Executive has secured the cooperation of domestic firms. Instead, most scholars 
assume that the government’s legal authority over domestic firms makes law the 
main force driving both the government’s harnessing strategy and corporate 
participation.37 Reality is more complicated: even when the government has had 
formal legal authority to compel corporate cooperation, it has often turned to more 
informal tactics—what Jon Michaels labels as “handshake agreements”—to recruit 
domestic firms.38 For instance, in contrast to the United States Postal Service and 
United Parcel Service, FedEx cooperated with government requests to open 
suspicious packages, even when the government lacked a search warrant. And 
while definitive proof of a quid pro quo exchange is difficult to come by, the 
government granted FedEx more government contracts after FedEx officials 
                                                                                                                 
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 489 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy]. 
For First Amendment rights specifically, see Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 170 (2007) [hereinafter Solove, The First 
Amendment]; Strandburg, supra note 3, at 743–44. For Fourth Amendment rights, see, e.g., 
Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435, 451 (2008); Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges 
to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661 (2008); Stephen E. 
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, 
Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007). 
 33. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 483, 509–13 (2010); Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 575, 589–92 (2010) (“The fact that the Supreme Court has never clarified (and, 
in fact, has consistently avoided clarifying) the precise legal status of intelligence continues 
to be an obstacle for meaningful intelligence governance.”). 
 34. E.g., Kitrosser, supra note 33, at 503–04; Michaels, All the President's Spies, supra 
note 3, at 922–26. 
 35. E.g., Greenwald, supra note 2; Paul Lewis, White House Unable to Confirm if 
Congress Briefed on NSA Spy Program, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 31, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/white-house-congress-nsa-xkeyscore. 
 36. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 933. Scholars express similar 
accountability concerns about the government’s increasing use of PSCs. Private security 
contractors allow the Executive to bypass Congress since the traditional mechanisms of 
congressional constraint—limiting access to military troops, setting disciplinary guidelines for 
the use of force, and reducing the level of military funding—are less available. PSCs also make 
monitoring more difficult. Michaels, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 1063–74. 
 37. E.g., Cate, supra note 32; Donohue, supra note 32; Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 
supra note 32. But see Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3; Michaels, 
Deputizing Homeland Security, supra note 24. 
 38. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 904. 
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cooperated and gave them special access to information about security threats.39 
After 9/11, the Bush Administration also relied on persuasion tactics to elicit the 
participation of Western Union, with former CIA Director George Tenet asking for 
that company’s informal assistance: “What I’m asking is that you and your 
company be patriots.”40 
Does it matter whether the government uses its formal legal authority or other 
forms of influence to elicit the cooperation of domestic companies? While 
government surveillance raises concerns about executive accountability on its own, 
such concerns are compounded when intelligence gathering proceeds through 
informal rather than formal legal channels.41 As Jon Michaels argues, handshake 
agreements free the government from legal and political constraints.42 When 
approaching specific companies, the Executive does not, for instance, have to seek 
congressional approval. There are fewer reporting requirements, fewer documents to 
examine ex post, and thus less pressure on intelligence operatives to evaluate their 
programs critically and proffer justifications for their existence.43 The Executive is 
also under less pressure to justify its decisions to the American public.44 
While domestic law scholars have focused on the government’s post-9/11 
domestic security strategy, international law scholars have analyzed its reliance on 
transnational governmental networks and international governmental 
organizations.45 For instance, some scholars have explored U.S. engagement at the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Id. at 915–16 (noting that FedEx has gained special access to government security 
databases, was granted a seat on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) regional 
terrorism task force, and was awarded a license from Tennessee to use police powers to 
investigate crimes and make arrests). By contrast, the telecommunications company Qwest 
lost government contracts after it refused to cooperate with the government’s Call-Data 
Program, under which other telecommunication companies transferred massive stores of 
“envelope information” (or metadata) to the NSA. Id. at 912–13. There, the NSA allegedly 
told Qwest officials that its refusal to hand over data might hurt its chances of getting 
classified work from the government. Id. The former CEO of Qwest further claims that his 
prosecution for insider trading, resulting in four years in prison was in retaliation for his 
refusal to cooperate. Dionne Searcey, Ex-CEO Exits Prison with a New Set of Pals, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 28, 2013, at A1. 
 40. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 914. This “just ask” strategy 
appears to have been effective. For instance, a large number of airlines, including JetBlue, 
Northwest, American Airlines, and United Airlines, have handed over troves of passenger 
data to the government based on such informal requests. SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 10–11. 
 41. Michaels, All the President’s Spies, supra note 3, at 924–25. 
 42. See id. at 954. 
 43. See id. at 934. 
 44. SURVEILLANCE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 26, at 2. 
 45. E.g., John W. Head, Essay, What Has Not Changed Since September 11—The 
Benefits of Multilateralism, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002). International law scholars 
have also focused heavily on U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly 
the interventions’ legality and legitimacy. See generally Tawia Ansah, War: Rhetoric & 
Norm-Creation in Response to Terror, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 797 (2003); Christopher 
Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, 
and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7 (2003). 
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U.N., where U.S. officials have worked both behind the scenes and publicly, 
lobbying the Security Council and the General Assembly to adopt wholesale U.S. 
sanctions against individuals, organizations, and states identified as national 
security threats.46 Scholars have also examined U.S. policy at the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), the main international organization that addresses money 
laundering and terrorist financing, where U.S. officials have worked with foreign 
officials to promote the implementation of anti–money laundering and 
counterterrorist financing policies.47 
Many, though not all, international law scholars have assumed this reliance 
on multilateral institutions to be a necessity, not a choice.48 In a globalized era 
marked by transnational criminal networks and the ability to move money 
instantaneously across national borders, states, including the United States, can 
no longer fight transnational security threats on their own.49 Now more than 
ever, individuals or entities that seek to escape a government’s jurisdiction may 
reroute or relocate illicit activity beyond a government’s reach, a phenomenon 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. In one prominent article, Jose Alvarez points to U.S. influence over the U.N. 
Security Council’s counterterrorism policies and resolutions as a clear example of 
“hegemonic law.” He writes, “No one has yet countered the suggestion, made by U.S. 
government officials when the CTC [Counter-Terrorism Committee] was established, that it 
was aimed at globally exporting U.S. counterterrorism legislation, particularly the U.S. 
PATRIOT Act.” Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 875 (2003). 
 47. Much of this scholarship emphasizes the role of the United States in shaping FATF 
policies. See, e.g., Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global 
Governance and Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 565–66 (2010); Ben 
Hayes, Counter-Terrorism, “Policy Laundering,” and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, 
Regulating Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Apr. 2012, at 5, 7. 
 48. I adopt the mainstream definition of multilateralism, which entails cooperation 
among governments. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global 
Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 382 (2000). Cooperation between governments and 
foreign private actors constitutes transnationalism. To be sure, scholars heralded the 
necessity of multilateral cooperation to address cross-border threats long before 9/11. E.g., 
Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified 
International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 709 (1999) (“Due to the global 
nature of terrorism, States rely less frequently on exclusively unilateral policies toward 
terrorism.”); Ernesto Samper Pizano, Colombia’s Commitment Toward a Global Agenda 
Against Drugs, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 265, 269 (1997) (stating that 
international cooperation, as opposed to unilateralism, is the “most adequate instrument” for 
confronting global challenges); Fred C. Pedersen, Comment, Controlling International 
Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and Proposals for Multilateral Cooperation, 
8 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1976) (discussing multilateral cooperation as a means to address 
international terrorism). This view took on new force, however, after the terrorist attacks. 
For a variety of views in the pre-9/11 period, both endorsing and criticizing unilateralism, 
see Symposium, Unilateralism in International Law: A United States-European Symposium, 
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2000). 
 49. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Bruce 
Zagaris, The Merging of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financial 
Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2001, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 123 (2004). 
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sometimes referred to as “leakage”50 or “crime displacement.”51 Governments 
may act extraterritorially under only very limited conditions, which makes it 
exceedingly difficult to detain or even track rogue actors and activity without 
the cooperation of other states.52 
This view of multilateral cooperation pervades both policy and scholarship 
and spans diverse issue areas.53 Urging more multilateral cooperation to fight 
drug trafficking, for instance, Deputy Director of the Global Maritime 
Operational Threat Response Coordination Center at the Department of 
Homeland Security Brian Wilson stated, “Successful pursuit of submersibles 
requires multilateral collaboration because the operating environment is simply 
too large for any nation to address individually.”54 Legal scholar Marshall 
Lloyd echoed, “Drug trafficking, for example, presents a different kind of crisis 
in light of the operations of criminal organizations. The impact of drug cartels 
and other groups extends beyond the jurisdictional reach of any one nation or 
organization.”55 
Writing more generally about the limited ability of states to unilaterally impose 
sanctions, scholars Anu Bradford and Omri Ben-Shahar explain: 
 In today’s integrated economy, unilateral sanctions are even less 
likely to be successful than they were in the past, because Targets have 
more opportunities to circumvent sanctions. . . . If the US refuses to 
buy oil from Iraq, the import ban can hardly be effective if Iraq can 
divert that forgone trade to third countries. Similarly, if the US 
prohibits its firms from selling anything but essential medicines to Iran, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. This term is used in the environmental literature. Jonathan Wiener, for instance, 
highlights how unilateral action would likely drive companies to move their emissions 
activity to unregulated areas. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits 
of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–70 (2007). 
 51. Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The 
Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 808–09 (2009). 
 52. It is widely accepted that states may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
nationality (nationality jurisdiction). Much more controversially, a state may arguably assert 
jurisdiction if its national security interests are affected (protective principle), if the conduct 
violates a jus cogen norm (universal jurisdiction), or based on the nationality of a victim 
(passive personality principle). For a discussion of these bases of jurisdiction see, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (1987); CEDRIC RYNGAERT, 
JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–9 (2008). 
 53. For this point relating to transnational maritime crime, see Jon D. Peppetti, Building 
the Global Maritime Security Network: A Multinational Legal Structure to Combat 
Transnational Threats, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 73 (2008). For crime in tax law, see Stephen 
Troiano, Current Development: The U.S. Assault on Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Impact on 
Tax Havens, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317 (2011). 
 54. Wilson, supra note 7, at 46. 
 55. Marshall B. Lloyd, Conflict, Intervention, and Drug Trafficking: Unintended 
Consequences of United States Policy in Colombia, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 293, 296 
(2011). Stacey Mathews noted about trafficking in children, “A multinational response with 
international coordination of law enforcement is required to thwart the enormous problem of 
trafficking.” Stacey Mathews, Comment, International Trafficking in Children: Will New 
U.S. Legislation Provide an Ending to the Story?, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 649, 653 (2005). 
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the measure is futile if other countries continue to supply Iran with 
comparable products at a comparable price. In other words, unilateral 
trade sanctions often only alter trade routes and capital flows without 
affecting the total level of commerce.56 
Scholars and policy makers have applied this observation to a range of 
transnational challenges that go beyond the implementation of sanctions,57 such as 
human trafficking58 and cross-border carbon emissions.59 Unilateralism is, in this 
view, an inadequate response to transnational challenges. Foreign policy expert 
Stewart Patrick put it this way: “[T]he choice is not between unilateralism and 
multilateralism but among variants of the latter.”60 
In contrast to this dominant view about the necessity of multilateralism, a 
narrower strand of international law scholarship has recognized the persistence 
of U.S. unilateralism to address cross-border security threats—most obviously 
illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, but also 
corruption61 and human trafficking.62 The primary focus of this scholarship is 
normative. While recognizing the need to assess unilateralism in its specific 
context,63 most scholars have also suggested more general arguments favoring 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Anu Bradford & Omri Ben-Shahar, Efficient Enforcement in International Law, 12 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 375, 390 (2012) (citations omitted). 
 57. Cloherty & Brenner, supra note 7 (arguing that international cooperation is 
imperative to fight terrorism). 
 58. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Slavery in the United States and the Law Enacted to Stop 
It Here and Abroad, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 317, 336 (2005). 
 59. Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
71, 98–99 (2008). 
 60. Patrick, supra note 7, at 2. 
 61. See, e.g., William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral 
Enforcement, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360 (2013). 
 62. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral 
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437 (2006). Other scholars 
have written about the use of unilateralism more generally, by countries other than the 
United States, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 5; Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International 
Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014), and for a range of 
transnational challenges including climate change, trade, and human rights. E.g., Rachel 
Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 1133 (2009); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic 
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2001); Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the 
International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (2002); Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of 
the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/Myanmar, 7 
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 455 (2008); Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, 
Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 31 (2012). 
 63. See Jose E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 393, 
403 (2000) [hereinafter Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents] (“The question—is 
unilateralism or multilateralism a good thing?—cannot be answered in the abstract.”); 
Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 41 (“The impact of unilateral action ultimately 
depends on whether it is persuasive in shaping norms of behavior.”); see also Cleveland, 
supra note 62, at 7 (discussing the possible efficacy of unilateralism in advancing human 
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or denouncing its use. Some scholars have underscored the role of unilateralism 
in helping to enforce or generate international law.64 Others have emphasized 
its efficacy in certain issue areas, such as promoting the development and 
internalization of human rights norms,65 stemming climate change,66 or fighting 
human trafficking.67 A number of scholars have criticized unilateralism as a 
function of domestic politics and argued that it undermines rather than 
reinforces multilateral institutions.68 Still others have criticized the use of 
unilateralism for specific issues, such as battling corruption,69 as well as drug 
and human trafficking.70 
Mirroring the tendencies of domestic law scholarship, these normative analyses 
generally overlook questions about how a government proceeds unilaterally—the 
precise tactics it uses.71 This silence is problematic partly because it leaves 
unanswered questions by those who suggest unilateralism is becoming obsolete 
about how the government is able to surmount displacement and leakage barriers. It 
is also troubling for another reason: by disregarding the process of unilateralism, 
international legal scholars have failed to recognize the government’s profound 
shift in individual tactics and overall strategy to address cross-border threats, 
leaving their normative assessments, at best, incomplete. 
                                                                                                                 
rights); Hakimi, supra note 5 (discussing how in some conditions unilateral action is 
preferable to multilateral action). 
 64. E.g., Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 
2015); Hakimi, supra note 5, at 107. 
 65. See Cleveland, supra note 62, at 31–48. But see Nyun, supra note 62. 
 66. E.g., Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate Change Unilateralism, 23 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 469 (2012); Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 38 (defending 
unilateralism on the ground that “relying on formal treaty negotiations may be too little too 
late to prevent dangerous climate change”). 
 67. E.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation: The Complex 
Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Trafficking, 24 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1143, 1147 (2003) (“‘Multilateral conventions’ lowest common denominator 
‘solutions’ [may] prove less efficacious than a hegemon’s concerted efforts to enforce 
extraterritorially its own domestic law to the same ends.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Jose Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 316 (1998)). 
 68. E.g., Danchin, supra note 62, at 109–13. 
 69. Magnuson, supra note 61, at 411–17 (stating that unilateralism has led to biased 
enforcement, overenforcement, and increased levels of instability). 
 70. E.g., Chuang, supra note 62; Lloyd, supra note 55; Monica Serrano, Unilateralism, 
Multilateralism, and U.S. Drug Diplomacy in Latin America, in UNILATERALISM AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 117 (David M. Malone & Yuen Foong 
Khong eds., 2003). 
 71. For exceptions, see James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 87 (2014) (discussing how the United States has used unilateralism as a 
mechanism for pressuring or inspiring other countries to change their own regulations and 
policies or as a stepping stone toward multilateral treaties); see also Krisch, supra note 62; 
Magnuson, supra note 61; Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 62, at 34–35 (discussing how 
U.S. unilateral actions spurred multilateral action). 
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B. The Turn to Foreign Banks 
The government’s policy of harnessing foreign banks serves two core goals: 
cutting off the financial pipeline72 and “following the money trail.”73 To achieve 
these interrelated objectives, the government has exploited its financial leverage to 
pressure and persuade foreign banks to cut their business ties with targeted actors 
and hand over financial intelligence. 
This strategy is new. Although the government has a long history of using 
economic statecraft such as trade embargoes, agency designations, and export 
controls to pursue its security interests,74 it has never adopted the finance-based 
strategy it is now using.75 Traditionally, the government’s use of economic 
statecraft has been characterized by two features: the core purpose of prohibiting 
“U.S. persons”76 from engaging in transactions with the targeted country, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See An Assessment of the Tools Needed to Fight the Financing of Terrorism: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 17 (2002) [hereinafter Assessment of the 
Tools] (statement of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury) 
(discussing “the importance of the war campaign against terrorist financing”). 
 73. “Specifically, ‘[o]ur objective is . . . to follow the money trail, and dismantle entire 
financial networks and channels from moving money to finance terror.’” Daryl Shetterly, 
Starving the Terrorists of Funding: How the United States Treasury Is Fighting the War on 
Terror, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 327, 327 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Financial 
War on Terrorism: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 5 (2002)). 
 74. For a brief synopsis of this history, see Peter L. Fitzgerald, “If Property Rights Were 
Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This”: Blacklisting and Due 
Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 88–110 (1999) 
[hereinafter Fitzgerald, Property Rights]. For a comprehensive description of U.S. use of 
embargoes and blacklists before 1998, see id. at 90–97; see also Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre 
Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online]. 
 75. In contrast to its current strategy, the U.S. government, like other governments, has 
previously used its financial leverage over foreign banks for more traditional financial 
reasons. For instance, it has conditioned financial market access to ensure financial 
soundness and stability of foreign banks. Other governments also use their market (though 
not financial) leverage over foreign firms for a range of more traditional regulatory goals. 
The European Union, for instance, uses its market leverage and regulatory capacity, along 
with other features, to shape unilaterally foreign rules regulating issues ranging from 
antitrust to public health. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 76. The government’s definition of “U.S. persons” includes foreign branches. Jeffrey A. 
Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 925 (2009) 
(“‘United States person’ [includes] ‘any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, 
entity organized under the law of the United States (including foreign branches), [and] any 
person in the United States.’”) (citing Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002)). In 
the exceptional cases of Cuba and North Korea, Treasury has defined U.S. persons to include 
foreign incorporated companies that are owned or controlled by U.S. persons. Harry L. 
Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 65 (1999); see also Meyer, supra, at 925 n.62. For an analysis of U.S. 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (by some definitions) through the regulation of U.S. 
parent-foreign subsidiary relationships, see Terrence J. Lau, Triggering Parent Company 
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government’s reliance on general U.S. market power, particularly in international 
trade.77 To ensure that U.S. persons do not use foreign entities to circumvent such 
embargoes, the government began to employ agency lists, such as Treasury’s 
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List78 or the State Department’s Debarred 
List.79 These lists target foreign actors as essentially “corporate cloaks” and 
prohibit U.S. entities from conducting business with them.80 Beginning in the 
mid-1990s, the government—by executive order and congressional legislation—
began to expand the purpose of these lists to create non-country-based programs 
targeting alleged terrorists and drug traffickers.81 
The government has also used export controls, which restrict outgoing trade based 
on the identity of participating parties and the nature of the product.82 Mirroring its 
                                                                                                                 
Liability Under United States Sanctions Regimes: The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting 
Approval and Facilitation, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2004). 
 77. For instance, the government has applied blanket trade embargoes on countries such 
as Angola, China, and Cuba. Fitzgerald, Property Rights, supra note 74, at 90–97. 
 78. This is an integrated list, currently 591 pages, containing more than 20,000 named 
individuals and companies that the government has deemed as posing some form of a threat 
to U.S. security. The list covers alleged terrorists, drug traffickers and WMD traffickers. 
Changes to the list are published in the Federal Register and in the form of email updates 
from the Department of the Treasury. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (2014), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf [hereinafter SDN LIST]. 
 79. This list contains the names of individuals and entities that have violated arms 
export control sanctions and are prohibited from exporting defense articles (including 
technical data) and defense services. See DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROLS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS—LIST OF STATUTORILY DEBARRED PARTIES JULY 1988–
NOVEMBER 2013 (2013), available at http://pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/documents/debar.pdf. 
 80. Fitzgerald, Property Rights, supra note 74, at 87. The government also freezes or 
blocks the entity’s property via OFAC. See Frequently Asked Questions and Answers Page 1, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs
/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#18 (“Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally 
prohibited from dealing with them.”). 
 81. The first of these lists was established by a 1995 executive order directing the Treasury 
to target Colombian drug cartels. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklists: Compliance 
Issues with US Economic Sanctions, 4 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 360, 365 (2001) 
[hereinafter Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins]. Three days later, OFAC created the Specially 
Designated Narcotics Trafficker Program (SDNT). See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, IMPACT REPORT: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST COLOMBIAN 
DRUG CARTELS 1 (2007). Other noncountry lists created between the mid-1990s and 2000 
targeted Middle East terrorists (beginning in 1995), governments that support terrorism 
(beginning in 1996), foreign terrorist organizations (beginning in 1997), traffickers in WMD 
(beginning in 1998), and narcotics traffickers (beginning in 2000). Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins, 
supra, at 362. 
 82. Although export controls initially applied only to items being exported from the 
United States, the government has since extended them to U.S. nationals on foreign territory. 
This occurred with the enactment of the 1979 Export Administration Act. Gregory W. 
Bowman, A Prescription for Curing U.S. Export Controls, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 599, 611–14; 
Larry E. Christensen, Unmasking the Myths, TRADE & FORFAITING REV.,  Mar. 2008, at 44, 
44–45 (2008). The Commerce Control List (CCL) includes items controlled for export or 
re-export by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) subject to the export licensing 
authority of the BIS. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2014). 
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use of agency lists to prevent U.S. persons from evading trade embargoes, the 
government has employed these lists to prohibit the exports of U.S. products from a 
non-U.S. country to a targeted country or entity—a policy known as “re-export 
controls.”83 
In a few rare but salient instances, the United States has tried to use these 
traditional economic tools with the primary purpose of influencing foreign private 
actors rather than U.S. persons. Each of these attempts to disrupt foreign 
transactions has largely failed. In the 1982 “pipeline case,”84 for example, former 
President Ronald Reagan attempted to prohibit European subsidiaries of U.S. firms 
from supplying oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union as well as 
to prohibit non-U.S. firms and subsidiaries, which were using U.S.-licensed 
technology, from exporting equipment or technologies to Russia.85 European 
governments protested vehemently, and U.S.-European relations quickly 
deteriorated.86 Using General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s death as pretext, Reagan 
retreated and lifted the re-export controls eleven months after he had first imposed 
them.87 
In 1996, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation that similarly tried to 
influence the business calculus of foreign firms, albeit by different enforcement 
strategies. Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act, better known as the Helms-Burton Act.88 This legislation aims 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. For a brief summary of re-export regimes for Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and 
North Korea, see Clark, supra note 76, at 68–71. If a foreign party is found to have violated 
such a restriction, and even if the government cannot prosecute the foreign actor for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, it can still impose penalties either by placing the party on an agency 
list, which involves some form of market exclusion, or by holding—where possible—the 
U.S. parent company liable for the conduct of its foreign subsidiaries. John P. Barker & 
Michael E. Ginsberg, Managing Compliance with U.S. Treasury Department OFAC 
Obligations: Even if Your Business Is Exclusively Outside the U.S., 5 GLOBAL TRADE 
& CUSTOMS J. 183, 184 (2010); see also Clark, supra note 76, at 71–72 (discussing the case 
of Fruehauf France). 
 84. See generally BRUCE W. JENTLESON, PIPELINE POLITICS: THE COMPLEX POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF EAST-WEST ENERGY TRADE (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1986). 
 85. William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal Process, 20 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 713, 721–22 (1997); see also Amendment of Oil and Gas 
Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (June 24, 1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 
376, 379, 385); Reexport of technical data and exports of the product manufactured abroad by use 
of U.S. technical data, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,251 (June 24, 1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 379.8). 
 86. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and Extraterritorial 
Trade Controls, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 117, 121; Homer E. Moyer, Jr. 
& Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal 
Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 109–10 
(1983). For more extensive analysis of the pipeline case, see JENTLESON, supra note 84. 
 87. Dodge, supra note 85, at 722; see also Bowman, supra note 82, at 638–39; 
Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online, supra note 74, at 70 n.320, 74 n.338. 
 88. The Helms-Burton Act was passed after Cuba shot down two unarmed airplanes flown 
by anti-Castro activists. Clark, supra note 76, at 72–73. This Act built on a 1992 law that 
prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. Id. For a concise 
discussion of these two pieces of legislation, see id. at 72–77. 
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exclusively at influencing foreign actors, as the government had already adopted an 
embargo prohibiting U.S. citizens and firms from doing business with Cuba.89 Most 
controversially, the statute establishes a cause of action for any U.S. national against 
foreign individuals or entities deemed to be “trafficking” in U.S. property confiscated 
by Cuba after 1959, when Cuba first nationalized U.S.-owned firms (Title III), and it 
prohibits any alleged trafficker from entering the United States (Title IV).90 
Less than five months later, Congress tried a slightly different legislative 
approach to shaping the business decisions of foreign firms. The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act91 (later renamed the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA)) penalizes any foreign 
person or entity that invests more than twenty or forty million dollars in a given 
year in the energy sectors of Iran and Libya respectively.92 Rather than rely on 
judicial enforcement as with Helms-Burton, the ISA requires the President to 
impose two of six possible sanctions on foreign entities that breach the treaty, 
limiting their access to the U.S. trade market.93 
Foreign governments were outraged by both statutes. They filed diplomatic 
protests and legal claims against the United States at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and adopted blocking statutes directing domestic companies to disregard 
the U.S. statutes.94 In response, the United States, while keeping the statutes 
formally on the books, retreated, and has refrained from enforcing either one.95 
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6010 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 515 
(2014). The Cuba embargo was initially implemented in 1962 as a response to Cuba’s illegal 
nationalization of U.S. property in Cuba. Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls 
(Secondary Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 625, 636 (2008). In 1993, the United States expanded 
the embargo, prohibiting almost all property transactions by U.S. persons with Cuba. Id. 
 90. In fact, Helms-Burton goes even further, preventing the officers and shareholders of 
corporations that trafficked in the confiscated property from entering the United States. Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 401(a)(3), 110 Stat. 
785, 822 (1996) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6091 (2012)). The Act even prevents 
family members of those individuals from entering the United States. Id. § 401(a)(4). 
 91. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)). 
 92. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sought to limit Libya’s and Iran’s ability 
to finance the development of nuclear weapons programs or support terrorism and to 
pressure Libya into extraditing two suspects involved in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. 
Ryngaert, supra note 89, at 639. 
 93. These sanctions include the following: denial of licenses to export products to a 
sanctioned party; denial of Export-Import Bank assistance regarding exports to a sanctioned 
party; for U.S. banks, prohibition of loans of more than $10 million to a sanctioned party; 
debarment of sanctioned parties from U.S. government contracts; import restrictions; and, 
for foreign financial institutions, denial of certain U.S. government banking privileges. Iran 
& Libya Sanctions Act § 6, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545. 
 94. Ryngaert, supra note 89, at 646–47. 
 95. The United States has not enforced Title III of the Act. Id. at 648 (noting that 
waivers for Title III have been continuously granted on a six-month basis and that Title IV 
has been enforced against only a few companies); see also KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 25 (2014) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN 
SANCTIONS 2014] (“No country has been designated a ‘Country of Diversion Concern’ 
[under Title III].”); Clark, supra note 76, at 91–92. 
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 Since the 9/11 attacks, the government’s strategy of influencing foreign private 
actors has undergone a profound shift. With the ultimate goal of isolating actors 
identified as national security threats, the government has begun to exploit its 
central position in global finance to induce foreign banks to follow U.S. security 
policy.96 The government’s shift in focus from restricting trade to emphasizing 
finance stems partly from its new understanding that the financial pipeline is a 
lifeline for terrorist activities and an “audit trail” for identifying terrorist 
networks.97 In his statement to Congress in 2002, Department of the Treasury 
General Counsel David Aufhauser summarized the underlying logic of a policy that 
aimed at cutting the financial pipeline to terrorists: “You can stop the killing if you 
can stop the flow of money.”98 Explaining how tracking terrorist finance is more 
effective than conventional intelligence gathering, Aufhauser elaborated, “[B]ooks 
and records that are not intended for public oversight to [sic] do not lie; they are 
literally the diaries of the enterprise of terror.”99 He continued, “That is kind of a 
melodramatic statement, but I don’t actually think it is possible to overstate the 
importance of the war campaign against terrorist financing.”100 In June 2005, 
President George W. Bush signed an executive order extending the dual focus on 
tracking and stopping money to counter the proliferation of WMD.101 The Obama 
Administration has continued this two-prong policy. 
Why would the government turn to foreign banks to cut off financial pipelines 
rather than simply rely on domestic banks or foreign governments? Sanctioning only 
the transactions of domestic banks likely would not suffice. Even if the United States 
and the European Union were to coordinate cutting their ties with a designated entity, a 
steady stream of finance and trade from other countries would likely fill the gap.102 In 
this respect, traditional domestic sanctions are inevitably self-undermining.103 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. The key difference between the government’s past and current strategies is that the 
past strategy exercised general market power while the current strategy exercises financial 
power. See infra Part II. 
 97. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Prior to the attacks, the Bush 
Administration had resisted calls for more banking regulations; its position shifted overnight. 
See Jesse S. Morgan, Dirty Names, Dangerous Money: Alleged Unilateralism in U.S. Policy 
on Money Laundering, BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 771, 771–72 (2003). 
 98. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Treasury asserted, “[W]e also 
recognize that the fight against money laundering is integral to the war against terrorism, and 
that effective anti-money-laundering practices will save innocent lives.” Peter Shields, When 
the ‘Information Revolution’ and the U.S. Security State Collide: Money Laundering and the 
Proliferation of Surveillance, 7 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 483, 484–85 (2005). 
 99. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. Others have described the task of 
tracking terrorist financing less optimistically. Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee 
Max Baucus describes the problem as “looking for a needle in a pile of needles.” Shetterly, 
supra note 73, at 328. 
 100. Assessment of the Tools, supra note 72, at 17. 
 101. Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R. § 170 (2005). For an extensive discussion of the 
origins, structure, and application of Executive Order 13,382, see CarrieLyn Donigan 
Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The U.S. Campaign to Freeze Assets of Proliferators 
and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 849, 852–82 (2009). 
 102. Bradford & Ben-Shahar, supra note 56, at 389–90. 
 103. See Bryan R. Early, Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S. 
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In theory, multilateral cooperation holds more promise than domestic action for 
placing sustained economic pressure on designated entities.104 But for the same 
reasons that purely domestic sanctions are inadequate, multilateral agreements on 
sanctions tend to be elusive. This elusiveness is partly due to China’s and Russia’s 
veto power.105 Even when the Security Council adopts resolutions, other 
governments may refrain from enforcing U.N. sanctions for strategic or political 
reasons or for sheer lack of capacity.106 Legal scholar Jeffrey A. Meyer summarizes 
the shortcomings of the domestic and multilateral options succinctly: “U.N. 
sanctions are increasingly difficult to achieve and enforce, while unilateral 
sanctions are of diminishing effectiveness because of the capacity and willingness 
of third countries to do business with those that the United States shuns.”107 
The limitations of domestic and multilateral approaches apply also to U.S. 
attempts to follow illicit financial trails. If the U.S. government were to rely 
exclusively on domestic banks for its financial intelligence, it might not be able to 
track foreign transactions effectively. Designated actors, suspecting the limited 
reach of the United States in surveillance operations, could move their transactions 
to non-U.S. institutions. Relying on multilateral cooperation for intelligence is 
therefore important.108 On its own, however, multilateralism too is inadequate: 
governments may be reluctant to hand over intelligence for political reasons, or 
they may simply move too slowly.109 
The new strategy of dollar unilateralism responds to these limitations. It targets 
foreign banks, which have the potential to bridge the gap between domestic and 
multilateral approaches: harnessing foreign banks prevents designated actors from 
easily finding new sponsors or new venues for their illicit activities. Moreover, 
with the cooperation of foreign banks, the United States is less dependent on the 
cooperation of foreign governments and multilateral organizations. In theory at 
least, a Russian or Chinese veto of U.N. sanctions is a moot point if foreign 
banks—including those in Russia and China—are implementing U.S. policy. 
The government may be drawn to foreign banks for other reasons. Foreign 
banks offer the same advantages as domestic private actors: better access to private 
information and reduced costs of enforcement.110 They can also help limit access to 
both U.S. and foreign markets and, thus, to the global economy. Furthermore, as 
                                                                                                                 
Economic Sanctions, 1950–2000, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547, 553 (2012). 
 104. See generally Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of 
Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137 (2011); 
Meyer, supra note 76. 
 105. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. Sees Window to Pressure Iran on 
Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A1; see also Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, Stalemate: 
A Short History of Sanctions Against Iran, PEACE POL’Y, Jan. 26, 2010, at 4, available at 
http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2010/01/26/stalemate-a-short-history-of-sanctions-against-iran. 
 106. See Eric Rosand, Current Developments: The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor 
the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 745, 760 (2004). 
 107. Meyer, supra note 76, at 924. 
 108. But see Arne Tostensen & Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, 54 WORLD 
POL. 373, 387 (2002) (discussing the ease by which targeted sanctions can be circumvented). 
 109. Robin Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at MM29 [hereinafter 
Wright, Stuart Levey’s War]. 
 110. See supra text accompanying notes 28–30. 
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revolving doors to international commerce and capital, foreign banks provide a vast 
repository of international financial information that U.S. banks may lack. 
II. THE TACTICS OF DOLLAR UNILATERALISM 
To implement dollar unilateralism, the government has deployed three 
innovative, overlapping tactics: financial sticks, high-profile blacklists, and direct 
diplomacy.111 The core purpose of each tactic is to influence foreign banks that 
have ties to the targeted actor, rather than to directly influence the target itself.112 
These tactics fall along a continuum of legal formality, both in their source of 
authority (whether or not the government’s tactics are precisely enumerated) and 
content (whether or not the government’s tactics impose binding obligations). 
The government’s first tactic, and its most direct exercise of financial power, is 
to wield financial sticks as a way to influence foreign banks to cut ties with targeted 
actors. Financial sticks are formal in both source and content: they are explicitly 
established by statute, executive order, or agency regulation, and they impose 
legally binding requirements on actors under U.S. jurisdiction. Although these 
sticks come in numerous forms—typically referred to by the summary concept of 
sanctions113—the primary one entails restricting or denying foreign banks’ access to 
the U.S. financial market if the banks continue to do business with targeted actors.114 
Second, the government, specifically Treasury, uses high-profile blacklists to 
pressure foreign banks, including those without U.S. ties, to limit business with 
targeted entities. As defined in this Article, high-profile blacklists entail the simple 
act of naming—in a highly publicized way—targeted financial entities and 
jurisdictions without any follow-up action. Treasury, more specifically the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), uses high-profile blacklists as 
the first step of a section 311 action under the Patriot Act. It issues a formal 
regulatory finding and notice of proposed rulemaking warning that an entity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. I adopt W. Michael Reisman and Monica Hakimi’s definition of “unilateralism” as 
acting outside formal legal processes, without the structured oversight of any external actor. 
See Hakimi, supra note 5, at 111 (citing Reisman, supra note 5, at 3). As Hakimi elaborates, 
“The legal system’s formal processes are typically structured so that multiple states consent 
to or oversee a decision.” Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Simon Tisdall, U.S. Financial Squeeze on Iran Yields Results, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/13/tisdallbriefing
.world (“Where direct U.S. regulatory enforcement is impossible, as with European 
businesses trading with Iran, American political, diplomatic and other pressures are proving 
to be almost equally effective.”). 
 113. This Article avoids the terminology of “sanctions,” since it tends to obscure 
differences among various types of sanctions and also creates terminological confusion. For 
instance, some scholars and policy makers would claim that the denial of correspondent 
banking to a third-party firm is not a sanction at all, but simply a regulatory condition that 
foreign parties can choose to follow or ignore. Other scholars and policy makers refer to 
correspondent banking restrictions using diverse terms including sanctions, sectoral 
sanctions, secondary sanctions, and triadic sanctions. 
 114. To be sure, the government frequently conditions access to the U.S. financial market 
(or uses some other financial stick) based on financial policies, such as ensuring adequate 
capitalization. It has not done so in pursuit of national security. 
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constitutes a “primary money laundering concern,” but does not require U.S. actors 
to take any action. High-profile blacklists are thus semiformal given their 
delineation under the Patriot Act but nonbinding nature. After it blacklists an entity, 
Treasury may proceed to the second step and adopt a final rule that directs U.S. 
banks to take certain “special measures,” such as closing correspondent accounts 
with the listed entity. Even when Treasury officials refrain from using such 
financial sticks at the second step, they anticipate that the simple act of naming an 
entity may encourage foreign banks to cut their ties.115 Foreign banks may do so to 
protect their market access (in case the government eventually imposes legal 
measures) and to preserve their reputations.116 
Finally, Treasury officials have turned to what appears to have been an 
unprecedented campaign of “direct diplomacy,” systematically holding meetings 
directly with foreign bank executives in addition to their meetings with foreign 
government officials. Direct diplomacy covers a broad range of practices: traveling 
abroad, sharing information, applying implicit pressure, using moral suasion, and 
appealing to professional or social identities. This tactic is legally informal because 
it is not explicitly enumerated by statute or executive order and does not impose 
direct legal obligations on participants.117 
The United States is able to deploy these three tactics because it is at the center 
of global financial markets. As the world’s leading reserve currency,118 the dollar 
accounts for more than sixty percent of the reserves of foreign central banks.119 The 
dollar is the most important international reference currency, and it is in high 
demand for stabilizing national currencies.120 Moreover, the dollar is the leading 
currency of cross-border exchange, including foreign trade, foreign-exchange 
trading, and international bond transactions.121 Importantly, the Federal Reserve 
clears all transactions in U.S. dollars. This means that if they do not have offices in 
the United States, foreign banks will usually hold correspondent or payable-through 
accounts with U.S. banks in order to preserve their access to U.S. currency.122 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 199–203. 
 116. I follow the literature in this area in conceptualizing reputational concerns as market 
based, without denying the possibility that sociocultural and professional aspects of 
reputation may also be in play. See, e.g., Judith van Erp, Naming and Shaming in Regulatory 
Enforcement, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 322, 323 
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2012) (describing three aspects of firm 
reputation that motivate compliance). 
 117. See Exec. Order No. 13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006); Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 
3 C.F.R. 789 (2002). 
 118. JUAN C. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL 
WARFARE 424 (2013) [hereinafter ZARATE, TREASURY'S WAR] (“This [financial] power relies 
on . . . the centrality of the United States as a financial center, and maintenance of the dollar 
as the world’s preferred reserve currency.”); see also BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT 
PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM (2011). 
 119. Alan Wheatley, Introduction to THE POWER OF CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF 
POWER 11–12 (Alan Wheatley ed., 2013) [hereinafter POWER OF CURRENCIES]. 
 120. See id. at 10. 
 121. Id. at 12. 
 122. Foreign banks establish correspondent accounts with U.S. banks so that the U.S. 
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The dominance of U.S. currency gives the U.S. government “the power to 
persuade and coerce.”123 At any moment, the government can choose to cut off a 
foreign bank’s access to U.S. financial markets and thus push it to the periphery of 
global trade and finance.124 The government does so either by suspending a foreign 
bank’s license to operate in the United States or by directing U.S. banks to shut 
down their correspondent and payable-through accounts for the foreign bank. This 
is, in effect, a death penalty for foreign banks. As David Cohen, Treasury’s Under 
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, explains, 
For banks and businesses around the world, if they don’t have access to 
the U.S. financial system, don’t have access to the U.S. economy, it is a 
significant if not mortal wound. That gives us a huge amount of 
leverage, a huge amount of opportunity to project U.S. power through 
our financial measures.125 
Foreign banks have been responsive to the government’s dollar unilateralism. 
They appear to have cooperated for a mix of reasons: to preserve access to the U.S. 
financial market, to protect their reputations within the international banking 
industry, and to defend social and professional norms. This is not to deny the 
existence of important exceptions; these harnessing tactics do not work all the time. 
The analysis below suggests both how the government succeeds in enlisting the 
cooperation of foreign banks and how such tactics can at times be derailed. 
In exploring dollar unilateralism, this Part draws on three cases. It first describes 
the government’s use of financial sticks to indirectly (through regulating U.S. 
banks) pressure foreign banks to cut their ties to Iran. It then discusses how the 
government has attempted to discourage foreign bank transactions with North 
Korea by employing high-profile blacklists. And finally, it details the government’s 
reliance on direct diplomacy for intelligence gathering and securing foreign banks’ 
cooperation with U.S. policies, drawing respectively on the examples of SWIFT 
and Iran. The discussion concludes with a brief consideration of whether these 
tactics have proven effective. 
                                                                                                                 
bank may act on their behalf, receiving deposits from the foreign bank, making payments, 
and engaging in other financial transactions. Foreign banks establish payable-through 
accounts at U.S. banks in order to grant their foreign customers access to the U.S. banking 
system. Barry E. Carter & Ryan M. Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial 
Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 906 n.20 (2013). For 
further explanations of correspondent and payable-through banking, see 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5318A(b) (2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 
311 of the USA Patriot Act (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1591.aspx. 
 123. Alan Wheatley, The Origins and Use of Currency Power, in THE POWER OF 
CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF POWER 17, 19 (Alan Wheatley ed., 2013). 
 124. Id. at 11. 
 125. William Mauldin, U.S. Treasury’s Top Terrorism Cop: How Financial Tools Fight 
Foes, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/02/u-s
-treasurys-top-terrorism-cop-how-financial-tools-fight-foes. 
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A. Financial Sticks 
 Using its financial leverage, the United States is able to convince foreign banks 
to limit or cut ties with designated actors.126 It does this primarily by requiring U.S. 
banks to limit or close accounts with foreign banks that do not adhere to U.S. 
policy. This financial stick is powerful in that, even when the U.S. lacks 
adjudicative jurisdiction over a foreign party, the government is able to penalize the 
foreign party through directing U.S. companies to refrain from engaging in 
business with it.127 
The financial-sticks tactic is exemplified by the American efforts to isolate Iran. 
Since the mid-1990s, the government has sought to stop Iran’s development of its 
nuclear program and its support of terrorist groups.128 Following the 2005 election 
of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the announcement that Iran was resuming 
its uranium enrichment and conversion program, the United States stepped up its 
policy of isolation.129 As part of this initiative, the government deployed three types 
of financial sticks: refusing to clear transactions in U.S. dollars, cutting off access 
to the U.S. financial market, and imposing financial penalties on foreign banks that 
violate U.S. rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. Although not discussed here, the government uses financial sticks as a tactic to 
follow financial trails as well. For instance, under the Patriot Act, the U.S. government may 
require a foreign bank with a correspondent account in the United States to hand over 
financial data located abroad. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 311, 115 Stat. 272, 298 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A 
(2012)). If the foreign bank refuses, the government can require U.S. banks to close its 
correspondent accounts for the foreign bank. See id.; see also BENN STEIL & ROBERT E. 
LITAN, FINANCIAL STATECRAFT: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY (2008) (discussing targeted financial measures to curb Iran’s and North Korea’s 
nuclear programs). 
 127. The government’s reliance on such agency measures (sometimes called 
administrative sanctions) is longstanding in the area of trade and has been a powerful tool. 
As Peter L. Fitzgerald explains, “If the parties to an unapproved re-export are unaffiliated 
with the United States and therefore beyond U.S. jurisdiction for enforcement purposes, the 
re-export provision nevertheless provides a basis for the United States to assert that a 
violation of its controls has occurred. It can then proceed to administratively sanction those 
involved with the violation by naming them to the State Department’s Debarred List or the 
Commerce Department’s DPL, even though they are otherwise beyond the reach of other 
U.S. enforcement processes.” Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online, supra note 74, at 43. 
Treasury’s employment of such measures in the financial (as opposed to trade) sector, 
however, is new—at least as a national security strategy. 
 128. See generally Quinton Cannon Farrar, Comment, U.S. Energy Sanctions and the 
Race to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2347, 2353–64 (2011). 
 129. Rachel L. Loeffler, Bank Shots: How the Financial System Can Isolate Rogues, 
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 101, 105. Both Congress and the U.N., for instance, were 
beginning to adopt more aggressive policies toward Iran. Two weeks after the first Treasury 
designation of an Iranian bank, Congress adopted the Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-293, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012)), which amended a 
previous statute to include sanctions for supporting Iran’s WMD program. 
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The government’s first financial stick in the context of its Iran policy was 
relatively modest and involved the ad hoc withdrawal and eventually full retraction 
of U-turn exemptions involving Iranian banks. U-turn payments occur when U.S. 
banks clear transactions between foreign banks, converting foreign currency into 
U.S. currency.130 In 1995, OFAC established a U-turn exemption to the Iran 
embargo, which allowed U.S. banks to process transactions for Iranian entities as 
long as U.S. banks did not directly credit or debit an Iranian account.131 U.S. 
officials had decided to permit U-turn payments in order to maintain the primacy of 
U.S. currency in the global oil market.132 Without such an exemption, they feared that 
parties might shift to a different currency rather than limit their transactions with 
Iran.133 
In 2006, Treasury began to prohibit U.S. banks from performing U-turn 
transactions that involved specific Iranian banks. Under the leadership of Stuart 
Levey, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasury 
first prevented U-turns from being performed for transactions with Bank Saderat, 
one of Iran’s largest state-owned banks.134 Treasury targeted this bank based on 
allegations that it had transferred funds to Hezbollah and other U.S.-designated 
terrorist groups.135 The Saderat U-turn prohibition made it substantially more 
difficult for foreign banks to do business with the bank. By closing this loophole, 
Treasury calculated that foreign banks would decide that it would be too burdensome 
to maintain business with Bank Saderat.136 Over the next two years, Treasury 
withdrew the U-turn exemption for an increasing number of large Iranian banks.137 At 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 37. 
 131. Matthew Levitt, The Iran Primer: Financial Sanctions, U.S. INST. PEACE, 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Financial%20Sanctions.pdf. 
 132. The other reason for the exemption was that the State Department wanted to prevent 
backlash to U.S. sanctions by its allies who were engaged in business with Iran and would 
have found the sudden inability to convert to U.S. currency seriously disruptive. See Brett 
Wolf, U-Turns: The History Behind the Loophole That Snared Standard Chartered, THOMSON 
REUTERS, Aug. 20, 2012 (unpublished article on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,569, 53,570 (Sept. 12, 2006) (to 
be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 560.516); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Revokes Iran’s 
U-Turn License, HP-1257 (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1257.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Revokes Iran’s U-Turn License]. 
 135. Glenn Kessler, U.S. Moves to Isolate Suspect Iranian Banks, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 
2006, at A17. The authority for OFAC to take such a measure was granted by Executive 
Order 13,224. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002). 
 136. See Danforth Newcomb, Non-U.S. Banks Are Target of Recent Economic Actions by 
U.S. Government, 125 BANKING L.J. 468, 469 (2008) (“Although banks with no presence in 
the United States are not bound by U.S. economic sanctions, these recent OFAC actions also 
impose indirect burdens on non-U.S. financial institutions engaging in certain transactions 
with these Iranian banks.”). 
 137. In January 2007, Treasury, specifically OFAC, named Bank Sepah and its wholly 
owned subsidiary incorporated in the United Kingdom, Bank Sepah International PLC. See 
generally Exec. Order No. 13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006) (providing the legal means by 
which naming occurs). See also Kittrie, supra note 9, at 806; John F. Cooney, Targeted 
Financial Sanctions, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2009, at 8, 8; Tisdall, supra note 112 
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the end of 2008, Treasury revoked its authorization of U-turn transactions for Iranian 
banks entirely.138 
In 2010, the government’s use of financial sticks to shape foreign bank 
incentives took a more aggressive turn. Rather than simply make transactions 
between Iran and third parties more difficult, the government began to force foreign 
banks to choose between maintaining ties to certain designated entities and 
protecting their access to U.S. banks. The shift in strategy and turn to its second 
type of financial stick was prompted by a number of Iranian actions, including 
Iran’s admission in September 2009 that it had built a secret underground uranium 
enrichment plant.139 
The initial move to step up financial pressure came from Congress and the 
President, not Treasury. Congress enacted the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA),140 which lawyers at one U.S. law 
firm describe as marking “a sea-change in the breadth and severity of economic 
sanctions against Iran.”141 Specifically, section 104 of the Act seeks to deter foreign 
                                                                                                                 
(“[T]he U.S. treasury and associated agencies have been spinning an expanding, entangling 
web of unilateral sanctions and other punitive measures around Iran’s financial institutions 
and commercial enterprises.”); Juan C. Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies: Smart 
Financial Power and National Security, WASH. Q., October 2009, at 43, 53 [hereinafter 
Zarate, Harnessing the Financial Furies]. 
 138. Iranian Transactions Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,541 (Nov. 10, 2008) (amending 
various provisions of 31 C.F.R. pt. 560); Treasury Revokes Iran’s U-Turn License, supra note 
134. 
 139. Ian Traynor & Julian Borger, Iran Admits Secret Uranium Enrichment Plant, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran
-admits-uranium-plant. The strategy shift was also in response to Iran’s test-firing long-range 
missiles a few weeks later and its backpedaling from a tentative agreement to a proposed 
enriched uranium deal. Iran Test-Fires Long-Range Missiles, CNN (Sept. 28, 2009, 11:35 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/28/iran.missile.tests/index.html. The 
deal would have required Iran to transfer seventy-five percent of its enriched uranium for 
processing by other countries. David Blair, Iran Pulls Back from Deal on Uranium 
Enrichment, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/middleeast/iran/6376902/Iran-pulls-back-from-deal-on-uranium-enrichment.html. Although 
Obama continued to press Iran to agree to the uranium-transfer deal, he abandoned that 
effort after Iran announced, in February 2010, the decision to begin enriching its uranium 
stockpile. See Alan Cowell & Thom Shanker, Iran’s Enrichment Plans Prompt New 
Sanction Calls, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at A6. Other factors also pushed the Obama 
Administration and Congress in the direction of harsher measures, including pressure from 
Israel and a desire to signal to other governments in the region that they would not need to 
begin their own nuclear buildup. See Mark Landler, U.S. Is Seeking Tougher Tactics Against 
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at A1; see also Isabel Kershner, Israel Voices Unease over 
Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at A14; David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, U.S. 
Speeding up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A1. 
 140. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8501 (2012)). Obama signed it into 
law on July 1, 2010. CISADA amended the Iran Sanctions Act, which replaced the ILSA in 
2006, following Libya’s renunciation of terrorism and WMD. See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 1–2, 4–5, 5 n.5 (2010). 
 141. Anthony Rapa, Amy J. Lentz, Peter Edward Jeydel, Edward J. Krauland & Meredith 
Rathbone, U.S. Sanctions on Iran: 2012 Year in Review, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Feb. 25, 
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banks from dealing with the Iranian government (including Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard) and other entities allegedly facilitating the development of Iran’s WMD 
program or supporting terrorism, including those entities sanctioned by the U.N. or 
designated by prior executive orders.142 It does so primarily by empowering the 
Executive with a severe financial stick: the authority to deny foreign banks access 
to the U.S. financial market.143 If Treasury (specifically OFAC) issues a finding that 
a foreign bank has knowingly conducted business with U.S.-designated actors, it 
places the foreign bank on the “Part 561 List” and imposes strict conditions on or 
forbids U.S. banks from opening or maintaining a correspondent or payable-through 
account for that foreign bank.144 Although such findings and Part 561 listings are 
exceedingly rare,145 the sheer threat of them is a powerful deterrent.146 
Congress deployed what is arguably its harshest financial stick in 2012, placing 
unprecedented pressure on both foreign banks and foreign oil companies. The 
central banking-related provisions enacted in the National Defense Authorization 
                                                                                                                 
2013), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-pdf.html/pdf/?item_id=8648. 
 142. These entities include parties that directly facilitate or engage in money laundering 
to facilitate Iran’s acquiring of WMD or support for terrorism, parties subject to U.N. 
financial sanctions, and parties that facilitate transactions or provide significant financial 
services for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps or affiliates, or any party whose assets are 
blocked in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD or support for international 
terrorism. See 22 U.S.C. § 8513(c)(2) (2012). OFAC issued the Iranian Financial Sanctions 
Regulations (implementing this CISADA provision) in August 2010. See 31 C.F.R. 
§ 561.201 (2012) (updated since ITRA was enacted); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141. 
Executive Orders 13,224 and 13,382 authorize OFAC to block property of those who have 
committed or are at risk of committing terrorism and those who assist in the proliferation of 
WMD. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 789 (2002) (terrorism); Exec. Order No. 
13,382, § 6, 3 C.F.R. 172 (2006) (WMD proliferation). 
 143. In targeting foreign banks, Congress sought to undermine Iran’s economy by 
preventing Iranian businesses from being able to acquire letters of credit that are necessary 
for transactions with foreign businesses. KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2014, supra note 95, at 
27. CISADA also sought to isolate Iran by: (1) stepping up pressure on foreign oil 
companies by expanding the scope of activity proscribed by the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, 
and (2) using a broad definition of “equipment and services” to prohibit the supply of refined 
petroleum and refining equipment or services by foreign or domestic persons. See 
Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1250–51 (2011). 
 144. 31 C.F.R. § 561.201 (2014). These restrictive conditions include: (1) prohibiting or 
restricting any provision of trade finance; (2) restricting transactions processed through the 
accounts; (3) placing monetary or volume limits on the transactions processed through the 
accounts; (4) requiring preapproval from the U.S. financial institution for all transactions 
processed through the accounts; or (5) prohibiting or restricting the processing of foreign 
exchange transactions through the account. § 561.201(b). 
 145. Only four institutions have ever been sanctioned under Part 561. The Part 561 List 
has not been updated since May 17, 2013, when Elaf Islamic Bank was removed. See OFFICE 
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE LIST OF FOREIGN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUBJECT TO PART 561 (THE PART 561 LIST) (2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/561list.pdf. 
 146. See supra text accompanying note 122. CISADA also mandated that U.S. banks and 
other financial institutions be penalized under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA) if they know, or should have known, that their foreign-owned or controlled 
subsidiaries had engaged in prohibited transactions with Iran. See 22 U.S.C. § 8513(d) (2012). 
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Act of 2012 (NDAA) prohibit U.S. banks from establishing new correspondent and 
payable-through accounts and require them to severely restrict existing accounts 
with any foreign bank that knowingly engages in transactions with the Central 
Bank of Iran (CBI) or any designated Iranian bank.147 The provisions also forbid 
U.S. banks from maintaining such accounts for banks, including foreign central 
banks and state-owned or controlled banks, domiciled in a country that sells or 
purchases petroleum to or from Iran.148 
In August 2012, President Obama also signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRA), which extends designations to new entities and 
codifies a 2012 executive order that imposed correspondent banking restrictions on 
foreign banks engaged in business with two Iranian petroleum companies.149 In 
addition, building on the 2010 banking provisions of CISADA, the ITRA imposes 
liability on U.S. parent companies of foreign-owned or controlled subsidiaries that 
conduct any transactions with Iran.150 The ITRA increases the number of sanctions the 
President is required to impose from CISADA’s three of nine to at least five of 
twelve.151 
Finally, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, a component 
of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, requires Treasury to take specific 
measures against any foreign bank that facilitates “significant financial” 
transactions with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors.152 These 
measures include requiring U.S. banks to cut off correspondent banking relations. 
President Obama followed up with a 2013 executive order that, for the first time, 
sanctions persons engaging in any “significant transaction” involving Iran’s 
currency, the rial.153 
These financial sticks appear to have influenced foreign bank calculations because 
they force a stark and costly choice between U.S. and Iranian markets. The sheer 
complexity of the sanction regime may have exerted an additional deterrent effect: 
seeking to avoid the laborious task of having to determine their compliance with U.S. 
laws and regulations, foreign banks refrain from creating any new ties with Iran, even 
for legitimate activity. As one U.S. lawyer asserts, “Because entities in Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi do not necessarily have expertise and sophistication in respect of US laws, this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
§ 1245, 125 Stat. 1298, 1647–50 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8513a (2012)). 
 148. 22 U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(4) (2012); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141. 
 149. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA), Pub. L. No. 
112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8701 (2012)). 
 150. 22 U.S.C. § 8725 (2012). 
 151. These twelve sanctions include, inter alia: prohibiting U.S. persons from investing in 
or purchasing significant quantities of equity or debt; prohibiting the U.S. government from 
contracting with a sanctioned entity; prohibiting transfers or payments between financial 
institutions involving any interest in a sanctioned entity, where the transfers or payments are 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction; and prohibiting most transactions of property in which a 
sanctioned entity has interest that is in U.S. jurisdiction. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2012). 
 152. 22 U.S.C. § 8803(d) (2012); see also Rapa et al., supra note 141. 
 153. Exec. Order No. 13,645, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,945 (June 3, 2013). The executive order 
permits the Treasury to prohibit the opening of, or put strict conditions on maintaining, a 
payable-through or correspondent account by the financial institution and to block all of the 
financial institution’s interests in property in the United States. Id. § 1(b). 
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just adds a layer of confusion and fear . . . . That itself can lead to companies . . . 
avoiding any kind of Iran business out of fear of possibly getting into trouble in the 
US.”154 
Finally, as its third financial stick, the United States has imposed or threatened 
to impose significant fines on foreign banks that violate U.S. laws and regulations 
prohibiting business with Iran or Iranian entities.155 For instance, in 2009, Treasury 
reached a $536 million settlement with Credit Suisse for facilitating transactions for 
Iran.156 In 2012 and 2013, partly due to violations of the Iranian sanctions 
regulations, the Dutch bank ING,157 British bank Standard Chartered,158 and British 
bank HSBC159 agreed to settlements of $619 million, $340 million, and $1.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Colin Simpson, UAE Businesses to Feel Effect of Fresh US Sanctions on Iran, 
NATIONAL (U.A.E.) (July 3, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/uae-businesses
-to-feel-effect-of-fresh-us-sanctions-on-iran (quoting Farhad Alavi, a partner at the Akrivis 
Law Group) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another U.S. law firm describes the 
deterrent effect of the increasingly complex legal landscape in these terms: 
Because these [rules] at times seem almost purposefully confusing, many 
non-U.S. financial institutions are carefully scrutinizing business because of the 
mere possibility, however remote, that an attenuated Iranian interest in a 
transaction would expose the bank to sanctions, possibly to a significant fine, 
and to adverse publicity. The strongest impact of these sanctions may be their 
mere existence rather than their exercise, as highly-regulated and risk-averse 
financial institutions steer well clear of the line. 
Sean M. Thornton, Iran, Non-U.S. Banks, and Secondary Sanctions: Understanding the Trends, 
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.skadden.com
/sites/default/files/publications/Iran_Non-US_Banks_and_Secondary_Sanctions_0.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
 155. See KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2014, supra note 95, at 27. 
 156. Claudio Gatti & John Eligon, Iranian Dealings Lead to a Fine for Credit Suisse, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at B1. 
 157. ING was charged with concealing $1.6 billion in illegal transactions with Iranian and 
Cuban clients, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the Trading With the 
Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2012). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MUL-565595, 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions
/CivPen/Documents/06122012_ing_agreement.pdf; see also Annie Lowrey, ING Bank to Pay 
$619 Million to Settle Inquiry into Sanctions Violations, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2012, at B3; Karen 
Freifeld, ING to Pay $619 Mln over Cuba, Iran Sanctions, REUTERS, June 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/ing-sanctions-idUSL1E8HC5Q420120612. 
 158. Standard Chartered was charged with concealing nearly 60,000 transactions with Iranian 
clients over ten years, involving at least $250 billion and generating hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in fees, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act (FNKDA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2012). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
MUL-607200, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121210_SCB_settlement.pdf; see also David Benoit, 
Standard Chartered’s Fine Tally Runs to $667 Million, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:15 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/10/standard-chartereds-fine-tally-runs-to-667-million; Karen 
Freifeld & Carrick Mollenkamp, Standard Chartered Reaches $340 Mln Settlement over Iran, 
REUTERS, Aug. 14, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/14
/standardchartered-probe-idUSL6E8JE3QK20120814. 
 159. HSBC was charged with processing 203 electronic transactions totaling more than 
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billion, respectively. In 2014, the United States imposed its largest fine to date: $8.9 
billion on the French bank BNP for its violations of sanctions on Iran (as well as 
Sudan and Cuba).160 
These settlements suggest that, at least until these penalties were imposed, the 
government’s financial sticks were not sufficient to deter some of the leading 
global banks from sweeping breaches of the Iran sanctions regime. For years on 
end, these banks flagrantly violated these regulations by conducting illicit 
transactions with Iran. They likely calculated that the profits from illicit 
transactions outweighed the risks and costs of getting caught. 
Yet it would be mistaken to assume that evidence of violations means that the 
use of financial sticks has had no effect. Aggregate economic data, some specific to 
banks, suggest that banks were indeed limiting their ties with Iran, even as these 
violations were ongoing.161 The true test of the use of financial sticks against the 
largest global banks is still ahead, and turns on whether such banks are, in light of 
the recent heavy penalties and restrictions on operations, newly motivated to 
comply with U.S. regulations.162 
B. High-Profile Blacklists 
In advancing its security agenda, the U.S. government has, to a more limited 
extent, also harnessed foreign banks by means that are less explicitly coercive than 
using financial sticks: employing high-profile blacklists. The government uses 
many forms of blacklists (or designations) for national security reasons, the most 
frequent and well known being the SDN List.163 This Article focuses on a different 
type of blacklist, which it terms “high-profile blacklists.”164 In this much more 
                                                                                                                 
$164 million with Iran, in violation of IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2012), and the 
TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2012). Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. 
HSBC Bank, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (Cr. No. 12-763); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
MUL-615225, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121211_HSBC_Settlement.pdf; see also Ben 
Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Said to Avoid Charges over Laundering, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A1; Kevin Scura, HSBC and Money Laundering: “Too Big To 
Indict,” AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com
/aclr-online/hsbc-and-money-laundering-too-big-indict. 
 160. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Reaches Largest Ever 
Sanctions-Related Settlement with BNP Paribas SA for $963 Million (June 30, 2014), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2447.aspx. 
 161. See infra Part II.B; see also KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20871, 
IRAN SANCTIONS 53–56 (2013) [hereinafter KATZMAN, IRAN SANCTIONS 2013]; Steven R. 
Weisman, Pressed by U.S., European Banks Limit Iran Deals, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A1; 
Laurence Norman, Swift to Cut Ties with Iran Banks After EU Ban, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303863404577283532862521716. 
 162. Still, these types of restrictions are, to at least some degree, inevitably self-busting: the 
more actors adhere to them, the greater the gain for any one actor who decides to violate them. 
 163. SDN LIST, supra note 78.  
 164. High-profile blacklists differ from SDN blacklists (or SDN designations) in two 
respects. First, they are high profile partly because they are relatively rare. These blacklists 
thus are well-recognized events in the finance community. For instance, newspapers are 
much more likely to report blacklisting under section 311 than an SDN designation. See, 
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salient blacklist, Treasury issues (under section 311 of the Patriot Act) a finding 
and notice of rulemaking that a foreign jurisdiction or foreign bank is a “primary 
money laundering concern.”165 It engages in this high-profile targeting with the 
goal of influencing other actors—here both domestic and foreign banks—to break 
ties with the blacklisted entity. High-profile blacklists can be considered 
semiformal because, despite their explicit congressional authorization, Treasury 
does not impose legal obligations on U.S. actors at the time of its blacklisting. It 
may, but is not required to, follow up a blacklisting by issuing a final ruling 
directing U.S. banks to take one or more of five “special measures” against the 
blacklisted institution, such as heightened due diligence or closing correspondent 
accounts.166 But even when it refrains from using these financial sticks, the 
government anticipates that foreign banks may abandon business with the blacklisted 
entity in order to preserve their market access167 or protect their reputational standing, 
particularly with other banks.168 As Juan Zarate, former Deputy National Security 
Adviser for Combating Terrorism, explained, section 311 enabled Treasury to put 
targeted banks under the global spotlight and “make them radioactive to 
reputation-conscious banks worldwide.”169 
                                                                                                                 
e.g., Rachel Louise Ensign, FBME Bank Named Primary Money Laundering Concern, 
WALL ST. J. (July 17, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/07
/17/fbme-bank-ltd-named-as-primary-money-laundering-concern. By contrast, there are 
thousands of SDN listings, which the government frequently revises, making such changes 
more routine. Second, unlike SDN lists, section 311 has a proposed rulemaking period in 
which it announces that an entity is at risk of being penalized, but does not actually impose 
the penalty unless it adopts a final rule. By contrast, once an SDN designation is made, the 
entity’s assets in the United States are frozen and transactions involving it are blocked. That 
is, the central purpose of an SDN designation is to cut the listed entity out of the U.S. market 
rather than, as in high-profile blacklists, influence foreign entities to cut their ties with the 
listed entity. Nonetheless, foreign entities sometimes follow the U.S. SDN List even when 
they are not legally obliged. 
 165. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 311, 116 Stat. 272, 298–304 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2012)). 
 166. Specifically, financial institutions under U.S. jurisdiction may be required to maintain 
records on: (1) transactions occurring in a jurisdiction outside of the United States, (2) the 
beneficial ownership of any account opened or maintained in the United States, (3) the identity 
and other information of any customer who opens or maintains a payable-through account, or 
(4) the identity and other information of any customer who opens or maintains a correspondent 
account involving any jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury may also 
prohibit banks from opening or maintaining a payable-through or correspondent account 
involving any jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern, or impose restrictive 
conditions on such accounts. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b) (2012). 
 167. For instance, foreign (and domestic) banks may reduce ties preemptively, expecting 
the government to impose follow-up measures later on. 
 168. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. For a recent survey suggesting the 
importance of reputation in the financial sector, see Scott Tangney, The 2014 Makovsky Wall 
Street Reputation Study, MAKOVSKY INTEGRATED COMM. (June 17, 2014), 
http://www.makovsky.com/insights/blogs/word-on-the-street/28-insights/blogs/word-on-the
-street/641-wall-street-reputation-study-2014. 
 169. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR, supra note 118, at 152. 
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The government’s formative experience with high-profile blacklisting was with 
a Macau-based bank named Banco Delta Asia (BDA), one of the most important 
foreign banks dealing with North Korea.170 Although hostile relations between the 
United States and North Korea date back more than half a century, North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 dramatically 
increased its perceived threat to Asia-Pacific security arrangements and the United 
States. In 2005, as part of a policy to intensify pressure on North Korea, Treasury 
blacklisted BDA as a first step under section 311 on the grounds that the bank had 
laundered money used to facilitate the proliferation and counterfeiting of WMD.171 
Even without taking the second step of wielding a financial stick in the form of a 
“special measure” or issuance of a final rule, Treasury’s naming of BDA had 
immediate, dramatic effects in the months following its section 311 blacklisting.172 
First, concerned that other banks would also be designated, Macau authorities took 
over BDA and froze $25 million of North Korean assets.173 Soon after, the bank’s 
customers moved $130 million out of their accounts.174 In less than a week, the 
bank had lost one third of its deposits.175 
More striking, the mere naming of BDA had a powerful impact on both U.S. and 
foreign banks. In what one journalist has likened to a “ripple” effect,176 banks 
across Europe and Asia with and without ties to the United States began to severely 
limit or entirely cut off their banking ties with BDA and North Korea.177 In January 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. For a rare insider account of the BDA action, see DAVID L. ASHER, VICTOR D. 
COMRAS & PATRICK M. CRONIN, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC., PRESSURE: COERCIVE ECONOMIC 
STATECRAFT AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 42–48 (2011). As the authors state, the 
government intended to use the BDA designation for three purposes: as a signal to China 
about the financial transactions of Chinese banks with North Korea, as a threat should 
negotiations with North Korea break down, and as an important instrument for unveiling 
evidence linking top North Korean officials to widespread criminal activity and exposing 
banks in Macau as complicit in money laundering. Id. at 43. It is worth noting that Asher et 
al. do not mention what scholars and the public often assume to be the main driver of U.S. 
sanctions: delaying or impeding North Korea’s nuclear program. 
 171. Finding That Banco Delta Asia SARL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money 
Laundering Concern, 70 Fed. Reg. 55,214 (Sept. 20, 2005). This was not the first time 
Treasury had designated an institution under section 311. In 2003, Treasury designated two 
banks in Burma as primary money-laundering concerns. See J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY 
LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 121 (2011). It is not 
entirely clear why this designation did not have the same impact, but possible explanations 
include that many countries already had sanctions against Burma and that Burmese banks 
were, compared to BDA, not as connected to foreign banks. 
 172. The Treasury Department imposed special measures only two years later, in March 
2007. Special Measures Against Banco Delta Asia, 31 C.F.R. § 103.193 (2010). 
 173. Steven R. Weisman, The Ripples of Punishing One Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, 
at C1 [hereinafter Weisman, Ripples]; see also ASHER ET AL., supra note 170, at 43–44; 
SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 123. 
 174. Javier Serrat, Money Talks: The Surging Revolution in Counter-Proliferation 
Strategy, RUSI J., Dec. 2011, at 40, 42. 
 175. SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 122. 
 176. See Weisman, Ripples, supra note 173. 
 177. SHARMAN, supra note 171, at 123 (“U.S. banks did not wait for the results of the 
FinCEN investigation but immediately cut their ties with the bank, as did major Korean and 
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2006, USB and Credit Suisse were among the first major banks to cut back on their 
transactions.178 By the summer of 2007, German, French, and British banks had 
followed suit, with Dubai banks close behind. Notably, these banks were not acting 
out of a formal legal obligation because Treasury had not issued a final rule 
imposing any special measures. 
In hindsight, banks’ decisions to cut ties with BDA and North Korea were 
probably motivated by both market access and reputational concerns, which are 
intertwined. Both U.S. banks and foreign banks with U.S. branches may have acted 
preemptively, expecting special measures to be imminent. Banks without U.S. ties 
may have cut off connections based on concerns that they, too, would be 
blacklisted for holding North Korean or BDA accounts.179 
In addition to these considerations of direct market access, both U.S. and foreign 
banks may have been influenced by more indirect, harmful reputational costs of 
being associated with a bank listed as a primary money-laundering concern.180 This 
potential influence of reputational concerns is evident in the United States’ attempt 
to return BDA’s frozen assets two years later during negotiations with North Korea. 
North Korea had mandated recovery of its funds as a precondition for proceeding 
with the negotiations.181 The U.S. government approached a number of U.S. and 
foreign banks to transfer the money back to North Korea, but the banks refused.182 
In the end, after promising that it would not enforce its own regulations in this 
instance,183 the United States was able to convince the Russian Central Bank and 
the Far Eastern Bank in Vladivostok to facilitate the transaction.184 Two years later, 
Treasury did impose follow-up measures requiring banks under U.S. jurisdiction to 
cut their ties with BDA.185 By this time, however, the issue was moot; banks had 
already closed their accounts. 
The important point here is not that reputational concerns influenced foreign 
bank decision making; that is ultimately an empirical question that warrants more 
analysis. Rather, the central claim is that U.S. government officials, both within and 
outside Treasury, shaped their policy to leverage reputational dynamics in the 
financial sector to extend their influence over foreign banks—even those with weak 
U.S. ties. As then-Treasury Secretary Paulson stated in 2007, “[O]nce some in the 
private sector decide to cut off those we have targeted, it becomes an even greater 
                                                                                                                 
Japanese institutions. The reverberation effect of blacklisting . . . came into play.”); see also 
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reputational risk for others not to follow, and so they often do.”186 Political 
scientists Peter Feaver and Eric Lorber explain the logic further: 
The rest of the system responds this way not necessarily because they 
agree with the designation—and perhaps not at all because they 
sympathize with the larger political aims—but simply because they 
agree that if others think this particular entity might be tainted they do 
not want the taint on them.187 
This worry about being tainted may apply not only to the initially blacklisted 
individual or entity, but also to its business partners. 
The reputational logic that the U.S. government sought to trigger with its 
high-profile blacklisting thus concerns intra-industry reputation more than 
reputation with the general public or individual clients.188 Banks worry that they 
may lose standing in the eyes of other banks, thus damaging their 
creditworthiness.189 Ample scholarship on the importance of reputation in the 
banking industry suggests that the government’s calculation about the role of 
reputation is at least plausible rather than mere posturing.190 As legal scholar 
Antoinette Verhage states, “Surprisingly, banks most fear the effect on their 
reputation with regard to other banks. Not many respondents worried about the 
effect of money laundering scandals on their clients.”191 If one bank facilitates 
transactions with a U.S.-designated bank, other banks are likely to move their 
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COMPLIANCE INDUSTRY 39 (2011) (stating that reputational damage can lead “to the loss of 
trustworthiness with regard to other banks”). 
 190. See, e.g., id.; Harvey & Lau, supra note 188. For a recent argument challenging the 
importance of reputation in the banking industry, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF 
CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013). 
 191. VERHAGE, supra note 189, at 81. Verhage further writes: “Reputation is stated to be 
one of the most important factors in the financial sector and can therefore be used as a 
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business elsewhere.192 Bank officials themselves have frequently stated that they 
comply with U.S. policy to protect their reputations.193 
The BDA blacklisting experience demonstrated to U.S. officials that they did 
not have to do much to influence the decisions of banks across the globe.194 As 
Zarate explained, “[W]hat appeared to be a simple unilateral regulation against a 
private bank unleashed the market-based financial furies against North Korea.”195 
As U.S. government officials view it, once they raise the red flag through 
blacklisting an entity, foreign and domestic banks cut ties for prudential reasons 
concerning market access and reputation. As former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice observed, Treasury’s novel strategy has relied on the banks’ 
self-interest “to protect their reputation and protect their investment.”196 
Treasury’s experience with BDA provided insights that the government began to 
apply in 2006 in its new campaign against Iran. One journalist described Treasury’s 
new logic: “Banks were only as reputable as their clients’ practices. And the 
reputations of banks that did business with Iran were at risk as long as Iran financed 
extremists and pursued missile and nuclear technology.”197 Then-Under Secretary 
Levey understood that these reputational concerns could reverberate beyond the 
limits of Treasury’s regulatory reach.198 Whether for market access or reputational 
incentives, the sheer act of naming a foreign bank, without any follow-up action 
implicating foreign bank partners, seemed to have gained traction. 
The government’s reliance on high-profile blacklists as a tactic is relatively rare, 
but still important.199 In 2011, for instance, the government blacklisted two Syrian 
banks under section 311 and took the special measure of requiring banks under 
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 193. See id. at 38, 42. 
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recently, Treasury designated FBME bank as a primary money-laundering concern. Rachel 
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17, 2014, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/07/17/fbme-bank-ltd-named
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U.S. jurisdiction to cut off their ties with both banks.200 One unnamed government 
official noted that the blacklisting could potentially move Russian banks to limit 
ties with their Syrian partners. As the official explained, Russian banks might fear 
that doing business with Syrian banks would put their U.S. accounts at risk.201 To 
be sure, Russia’s more recent invasion of Ukraine and Treasury’s subsequent 
financial restrictions on Russian banks and other entities complicates this picture.202 
But the logic underlying Treasury’s tactic of semiformal measures still prevails. As 
Rachel L. Loeffler notes, “Banks outside the United States often adhere to U.S. watch 
lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so.”203 
C. Direct Diplomacy 
The final and most informal tactic that Treasury uses to enlist the help of foreign 
banks is “direct diplomacy.” In addition to meeting with foreign government 
officials, Treasury officials meet directly with foreign bank executives to elicit their 
cooperation with U.S. policy, both to track and stop illicit financial flows. Although 
the government uses direct diplomacy regularly with foreign government officials 
and domestic firms,204 as far as the public record shows, this form of systematic 
diplomatic outreach to foreign bank executives emerged only after 9/11. In source, 
direct diplomacy is less formal than blacklisting and financial sticks, since the legal 
sources Treasury might point to for its authority do not specifically authorize or 
discuss diplomacy.205 Like high-profile blacklists, direct diplomacy is similarly 
informal in content; it does not impose legal obligations on those involved in the 
meetings. Nonetheless, it too may trigger foreign banks’ concerns about market 
access and reputation, moving them to shut down ties even in the absence of a 
binding legal obligation. 
One example of direct diplomacy comes from the government’s efforts to 
collect financial intelligence from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), a private Belgium-incorporated telecommunications 
consortium of foreign banks.206 Established in 1973 by European banks,207 SWIFT 
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 203. Loeffler, supra note 129, at 102. 
 204. See KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS BEYOND BORDERS (2001). 
 205. Infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
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serves essentially as an “electronic postal service for the financial industry.”208 It 
does not accept deposits but instead transfers messages between international 
parties to a financial transaction.209 In the words of one journalist, SWIFT is the 
“mother lode, the Rosetta stone for financial data.”210 Along with a U.S.-based 
private consortium, Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS),211 
SWIFT has acquired a near monopoly on bank messaging.212 Almost every 
international bank transaction is sent through SWIFT networks and SWIFT servers. 
Tapping into the SWIFT database is, as one legal scholar put it, “a childhood dream 
for many intelligence officers.”213 
Between 2002 and 2006, Treasury convinced SWIFT officials to covertly hand 
over troves of financial data. When SWIFT officials hesitated, Treasury, and the 
executive branch more broadly, turned to direct diplomacy to ensure SWIFT’s 
continued collaboration. Compared to financial sticks and high-profile blacklists, 
Treasury’s tactic was legally informal: there seemed to be no explicit congressional 
approval or executive order mandating its direct diplomacy campaign, nor did the 
campaign itself impose legal obligations on SWIFT officials.214 Yet, for a time, 
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the European Union, also has the power to block the flow of money by excluding banks from 
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direct diplomacy worked: the SWIFT surveillance operation was the government’s 
primary source of financial intelligence during this period, one that the government 
claims helped to identify a number of terrorists.215 Following the New York Times’ 
exposure of the surveillance program in 2006, however, SWIFT’s collaboration 
with the government became significantly more limited, restricting U.S. access to 
intra-European transactions.216 
The government-SWIFT partnership is useful in shedding light on how foreign 
banks may cooperate with the U.S. government for reasons beyond legal obligation. 
At first glance, SWIFT’s cooperation looks like a simple case of legal compulsion 
based on territorial jurisdiction; SWIFT had and still has an operation center in the 
United States, giving the government, specifically Treasury, the ability to subpoena 
and gain full access to SWIFT’s vast repository of financial data.217 Yet, a closer 
analysis reveals that this territorial-jurisdiction explanation is only partial. It shows 
that the mere assertion of legal authority by the United States does not necessarily 
make law the main force motivating foreign firms’ cooperation with U.S. policies. 
At least twice before 9/11, the U.S. government issued subpoenas demanding 
access to SWIFT’s data.218 For example, it did so in the early 1990s, in the middle 
of the “war on drugs,” when under President George H.W. Bush, the Department of 
Justice appears to have requested access to SWIFT’s database.219 Following the 
1998 embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, the CIA and the 
Department of Treasury in the Clinton Administration requested access.220 Both of 
these times, SWIFT officials refused.221 Under significant pressure from the first 
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Bush Administration, SWIFT threatened to move its center out of the United States 
if the government continued to pressure it.222 The government backed down.223 The 
U.S. government’s legal authority did not change between the first two refuted 
subpoena attempts and the post-9/11 subpoena. The obvious question arises: Why, 
after 9/11, did SWIFT then suddenly agree to cooperate when it had resisted earlier? 
A purely legal explanation pointing to territoriality leaves that question unanswered. 
SWIFT’s initial post-9/11 cooperation—transferring data to Treasury and CIA 
on a monthly basis—appears not to have been a function of direct diplomacy or any 
other government strategy.224 Rather, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, SWIFT’s 
cooperation seems better explained by a wave of both individual and transnational 
support for and identification with the United States.225 In the words of one senior 
SWIFT official, before 9/11, “providing access to its sensitive data would have been 
anathema to the Belgium-based consortium,” but the 9/11 attacks “led to a new 
mindset in many industries, including telecommunications.”226 As the shock of 9/11 
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began to abate and the contentious politics of the Iraq War took center stage, 
SWIFT’s willingness to give the government essentially carte blanche to access its 
enormous data repository began to wane.227 By the spring of 2003, despite monthly 
Treasury subpoenas, SWIFT had begun to withhold its data. U.S. government 
officials, as New York Times journalist Eric Lichtblau put it, “were panicked.”228 
To persuade SWIFT to continue its collaboration, the government did not 
impose additional legal obligations or insist on existing ones, but turned instead to 
direct diplomacy—specifically, “red-carpet” treatment of SWIFT officials. 
Treasury officials, in the words of Lichtblau, “scrambled to set up a day-long series 
of emergency meetings in Washington to plead their case directly to SWIFT’s 
executives.”229 This direct diplomacy evolved into a “full-court press.”230 CIA 
officials gave SWIFT officials a classified briefing in the Situation Room. National 
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made “a surprise appearance.”231 High-level 
Treasury officials and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan held a meeting with 
SWIFT officials. And lastly, FBI Director Robert Mueller shared intelligence showing 
the specific instances in which SWIFT data had helped to identify terrorist threats.232 
The red-carpet diplomacy strategy worked, although it is difficult to understand 
precisely why it was effective.233 One possibility is that the classified information 
that the CIA made available was so persuasive that SWIFT officials revised their 
calculations about the merits and justifiability of the program. It is also possible 
that meetings with top U.S. officials created social and professional pressures that 
were hard to resist. SWIFT officials probably had never envisaged that they would 
be invited to the White House, much less have direct talks with leading figures of 
the Administration. Nor could they have dreamed of being ushered into the 
Situation Room for a briefing by the brass of the CIA. A final possibility is that 
SWIFT felt reassured by the proposal for new, somewhat more stringent 
procedures regulating surveillance operations.234 The new procedures allowed a 
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SWIFT official to be present during data searches and granted SWIFT the authority 
to stop searches that appeared to exceed the scope of the investigation.235 
The SWIFT-Treasury financial surveillance operation continued undetected for 
another three years, until the New York Times disclosed it on June 23, 2006.236 The 
fallout of the disclosure exposed the limits of direct diplomacy. The revelation of 
the operation incited criticism by some in the United States, including civil rights 
groups and both conservative and liberal members of Congress.237 Other political 
groups and Bush Administration officials issued statements, some of them scathing, 
condemning the New York Times for exposing the covert collaboration.238 In 
Europe, news of the SWIFT-U.S. operation triggered outrage.239 Bank regulators, 
human rights groups, and many members of the European Parliament were 
incensed; they viewed the surveillance program as a blanket violation of European 
privacy laws.240 In September 2006, for instance, the Belgian Privacy Commission 
released a report rebuking SWIFT for its data transfers.241 
In response to this barrage of criticism, SWIFT announced in June 2007 that it 
would begin to restructure its data-storage programs to allow for intra-European 
financial data to be stored only in Europe.242 Once the restructuring was completed 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/world/europe/28iht-suit.2071000.html. 
 240. See id.; Dan Bilefsky, Europeans Berate Bank Group and Overseer for U.S. Access 
to Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at A15. A leading privacy rights NGO based in London, 
Privacy International, filed complaints with data protection authorities in thirty-two 
countries. Dan Bilefsky, Group Tries to Block Program Giving Data to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/27cnd-secure.html. 
 241. ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE COMMISSION, supra note 221. The Commission retracted the 
report two years later on grounds that surveillance operations were consistent with U.N. 
security resolutions and that SWIFT had taken substantial measures after the program’s 
disclosure to enhance its data protections. KÖPPEL, supra note 208, § 1.4. 
 242. This entailed installing a new operation center in Switzerland and then allowing 
countries to decide whether they wanted their transactions to go through the European 
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in January 2010,243 the United States would no longer have access to financial 
transactions conducted within Europe.244 True to the words of SWIFT officials, the 
new operation center opened in January 2010.245 
SWIFT’s decision to shift the intra-European data out of the United States’ 
reach is important: it shows that red-carpet diplomacy is effective only under some 
conditions. In this case, SWIFT’s reputational concerns about client privacy won 
out over the Americans’ red-carpet persuasion campaign. 
SWIFT’s change in policy is also important because it provides strong evidence 
that SWIFT’s cooperation between 2002 and 2006 was not simply a function of legal 
compulsion based on U.S. subpoenas. Before and after 2006, SWIFT officials had the 
same option of insulating some or all of its data by moving it abroad. What motivated 
SWIFT to insulate its data after 2006 was not a shift in the government’s legal 
authority, but in SWIFT’s incentives. Before the New York Times exposé, SWIFT’s 
reputation was not on the line, and there was no public pressure to reject U.S. 
subpoenas. Direct diplomacy and post-9/11 allegiance, however fleeting, gave SWIFT 
officials sufficient reason to cooperate. Put differently, SWIFT was legally obligated to 
respond to U.S. subpoenas. But legal obligation does not fully explain why it did so. 
The United States has also used direct diplomacy with foreign bank executives 
in its efforts to stem the flow of money to Iran.246 Treasury officials recognized that 
it would be useful to do more than rely on financial sticks and high-profile 
blacklists to steer foreign banks away from their Iranian connections. In 2005,247 
they began to launch an unprecedented series of diplomatic initiatives, holding 
meetings directly with foreign bank officials and urging them to cut off connections 
with Iran. Treasury met not only with banks that had strong U.S. ties—those with 
branches or subsidiaries located in the United States—but also with banks that did 
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not.248 While Treasury officials did not abandon traditional, 
government-to-government diplomacy, they concentrated their efforts on direct 
outreach to foreign executives.249 As with its direct diplomacy with SWIFT, the 
diplomacy campaign in the Iran case was legally informal. Executive orders appear 
to have generally authorized but did not specifically enumerate Treasury’s 
diplomatic campaign, and Treasury’s campaign did not impose binding obligations 
on participants.250 
Termed the “intellectual architect”251 behind the diplomatic campaign, then-
Under Secretary Levey and his successors recognized the benefits of appealing 
directly to foreign private banks, rather than approaching them indirectly by 
making contacts with their governments. Foreign governments might refuse or be 
reluctant to pressure their own banks into following U.S. policy, particularly 
when the policy imposes high costs on banks and lacks legitimacy with domestic 
publics or the governments themselves. By approaching the private sector 
directly, the United States avoids putting foreign governments in the position of 
having to choose sides. Former Treasury Secretary Paulson has gone further and 
suggested that direct diplomacy is more effective than the traditional approach 
because foreign banks may actually induce foreign governments to spring into 
action: “Such voluntary implementation by the private sector in turn makes it 
even more palatable for governments to impose similar measures, thus creating a 
mutually reinforcing cycle of public and private action.”252 Other U.S. officials 
view direct diplomacy with the private sector as more efficient. In the words of 
Condoleezza Rice, “The private sector has proved ‘quicker to respond’ than 
governments.”253 
As far as the public record shows, such diplomatic targeting of foreign banks is 
unprecedented.254 Between 2005 and 2008, Treasury officials made extensive use 
of it: they “made overtures” to 145 banks in sixty countries.255 In some instances, 
such as in the United Arab Emirates, they scheduled repeat visits to the same 
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country.256 Described by one journalist as “Stuart Levey’s War,”257 Levey himself 
made more than eighty foreign trips on his own, meeting with more than sixty 
different foreign bank officials.258 After Levey’s departure from Treasury for the 
private sector, Treasury officials continued this practice of direct outreach. In 2010, 
for instance, they conducted three weeks of meetings with senior government 
officials and bank regulators, as well as the CEOs of private banks in countries 
including Bahrain, Ecuador, Lebanon, and Turkey.259 
The limited information available suggests that these meetings served as channels 
for sharing classified information and to signal the priority the U.S. government was 
giving to its Iran policy.260 To make their case to foreign banks,261 Treasury officials, 
for instance, produced data showing that Bank Sepah had requested foreign banks to 
strip its transactions of any identifying information, such as the bank’s name, in the 
attempt to secure access to the U.S. financial system.262 They also showed documents 
tracing the transfer of $50 million from the Iranian Bank Saderat through a London 
subsidiary to a charity affiliated with Hezbollah in Lebanon.263 
Why have foreign banks cooperated with the U.S. government’s diplomatic 
outreach in the absence of a legal directive? Treasury officials offer one possible 
explanation: the meetings they organize make banks aware of the reputational risks 
involved in dealing with Iran. As Levey stated, “All the banks we’ve talked to are 
reducing significantly their exposure to Iranian business . . . . It’s been a universal 
response. They all recognize the risks—some because of what we’ve told them and 
some on their own. You don’t have to be Sherlock Holmes to see the dangers.”264 
Paulson echoed that sentiment: “As a result of our outreach and targeted measures, 
financial institutions around the world are more sensitive than ever about the very 
substantial risks posed by doing business with Iran.”265 Paulson continued, “For the 
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most part, they are not legally required to take these steps but they have decided, as 
a matter of prudence and integrity, that they do not want to be the bankers for such 
a regime.”266 U.S. officials emphasize that foreign banks are moving away from 
Iran based on self-interest rather than legal obligation. 
While diplomatic meetings frequently provided foreign banks with new and 
concrete information about ongoing illicit transactions, which may very well have 
triggered banks’ reputational and market-access concerns, the mere occurrence of 
such meetings may have been as important as their actual content. The willingness 
of Treasury officials to fly across the globe to meet personally with foreign bank 
leaders sent an unmistakably clear, if unspoken, signal that the United States was 
serious about its policy to isolate Iranian banks and Iran more generally. According 
to one journalist, “One of the main unspoken messages of the visits, experts say, is 
that the United States government may eventually bar American banks from 
working with financial institutions doing business with groups tied to terrorism.”267 
Treasury officials, however, deny making any kind of implicit threat. In Paulson’s 
words, “We never threaten . . . . We talk about how important it is not to violate the 
rules and engage in illicit transactions.”268 
At least some foreign bank executives, however, viewed their meetings with 
Treasury officials not as friendly efforts at persuasion, as Paulson intimates, but as 
a form of coercive diplomacy. In this view, direct diplomacy served as an implicit 
threat that if the banks did not fall in line by cutting their ties with their Iranian 
partners, the United States would take some form of punitive action.269 There is 
evidence to support this view. In 2011, for instance, Treasury officials met with 
representatives of the four largest Chinese banks to dissuade them from doing 
business with Iran’s shipping industry. Treasury officials warned that if the banks 
maintained their business ties, they might be cut off from the U.S. market.270 
Whether motivated by direct market pressure or concerns about reputational 
risk, some foreign bank officials, despite cooperating with the United States, are 
resentful. One European diplomat stated, “[Foreign bank officials are] not happy 
with what’s happening . . . . They complain about U.S. pressure, but accept it. They 
hope it will pass soon.”271 Officials from Dubai expressed similar frustration. 
According to the Central Bank governor, “Sometimes, yes, we feel that the United 
States is asking too much.”272 In private discussions, bankers at Standard Chartered 
put it more bluntly: “You f—ing Americans. Who are you to tell us, the rest of the 
world, that we’re not going to deal with Iranians.”273 
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D. Multilateralism in Disguise? 
On important questions of national security, the three harnessing tactics 
comprise a dollar unilateralism strategy that appears to be effective in shaping 
foreign bank incentives under some circumstances (Iran) but not others 
(SWIFT).274 Rather than defining efficacy broadly as whether the ultimate 
objectives of the government’s policy are served, this Article prefers a narrow 
definition focused on the extent to which the government’s harnessing strategy has 
influenced foreign banks. 
In the case of Iran, dollar unilateralism has been credited with driving foreign 
banks to cut ties with the Iranian regime, and has arguably pressured the Iranian 
government into negotiations over its nuclear weapons policy.275 Without more and 
better data about the precise identity of the banks, it is admittedly difficult to 
establish conclusively that foreign banks were responding to U.S. policy. Yet, the 
evidence available indicates that the U.S. strategy had a strong influence on foreign 
banks. For instance, as the government was incrementally withdrawing U-turn 
exemptions and conducting direct diplomacy between 2006 and 2008, the number 
of foreign banks operating in Iran dropped by more than half, from forty-six to 
twenty.276 This steep decline has led one scholar to describe the government’s 
harnessing strategy, and specifically its use of financial leverage to isolate targeted 
countries, as the closest it has come to the “Holy Grail.”277 Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests the efficacy of harnessing.278 One journalist noted, for instance, that French 
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banks stopped offering letters of credit for trade involving Iran and quotes an oil 
refiner as stating that “it is today impossible more or less in Europe, with a couple of 
exceptions, to get a letter of credit.”279 Banks in the United Arab Emirates also 
reportedly refused to issue letters of credit.280 “The momentum,” another journalist 
claims, “surprised even Levey.”281 
One explanation for the apparent effectiveness of dollar unilateralism is that it is 
simply multilateralism in disguise.282 Treasury officials state that they have gone to 
great lengths to secure the cooperation and support of foreign governments.283 Both 
the European Union and U.N., for instance, have imposed restrictive conditions on 
Iran that surely contributed to that country’s isolation.284 Although it is undeniable 
that international support has strengthened the impact of U.S. policies, it would be 
a mistake to assume that U.S. harnessing is simply a form of masked 
multilateralism for two reasons. 
First, U.N. sanctions on Iran have been much narrower than U.S. restrictions, and 
those sanctions that are in place were largely a product of U.S. influence.285 The 
European Union’s “restrictive measures,”286 while more extensive than U.N. 
sanctions, have not influenced Iranian banks at every juncture. For example, after 
being blacklisted by Treasury, Bank Saderat’s correspondent bank relationships 
reportedly fell from twenty-nine to eight.287 As one researcher noted, this is a telling 
sign that banks were being influenced specifically by Treasury’s policy, since neither 
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the U.N. nor the European Union placed any kind of restrictions on Bank Saderat.288 
Moreover, even when E.U. courts have invalidated specific designations of Iranian 
banks,289 there is no evidence to suggest that European banks have considered 
reestablishing business connections with Iranian entities. European banks may of 
course have refrained, expecting the European Union to simply redesignate the 
Iranian banks.290 But even without such designations, European banks would be 
unlikely to revive business ties given that U.S. policies are still in effect.291 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, when important governments have 
resisted U.S. policy, the United States has—even while attempting to secure their 
cooperation—used dollar unilateralism to circumvent them. For instance, 
possessing strong ties to Iran, Turkey has explicitly stated that it has no intention of 
adhering to unilateral U.S restrictions. On the brink of being targeted for a new 
wave of direct diplomacy by the U.S. government, the Turkish Trade Minister 
criticized the United States for pressuring Turkish banks and stated his opposition 
in unyielding terms: “[W]e cannot tolerate it.”292 The Chinese government has also 
publicly and repeatedly opposed the government’s “wanton unilateralist practice.”293 
Other countries have expressed no more than reluctant support, most likely the result 
of quiet coercion.294 As the United Arab Emirates’ minister of economy Sheikha 
Lubna al Qasimi explains, the United Arab Emirates’ and Iran’s economic ties are 
longstanding and run deep. “At the end of the day, Iran is a neighbor.”295 
Underscoring what makes harnessing foreign banks so appealing to the U.S. 
government, in each of these cases—Turkey, China, and the United Arab 
Emirates—foreign banks have claimed that, in contrast to their governments’ 
positions, they are adhering to U.S. regulations. Turkish bankers have noted in 
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private conversation that Turkish banks with U.S. shareholders have “cut back 
sharply” their ties with Iran.296 Chinese lawyers have reported that Chinese 
companies, especially banks, are taking significant measures to comply with U.S. 
laws. One lawyer in Shanghai pointed to the example of an Iranian company that 
was unable to invest in China because local banks refused to open an account for 
it.297 Even in Dubai, referred to as “Iran’s offshore business center,”298 banks have 
been cutting back. For example, one large Dubai-based bank announced that, in 
response to U.S. policies, it was closing down all accounts with Iranian banks.299 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the effectiveness of the 
government’s new harnessing strategy in influencing the decisions of foreign 
banks. Although the government’s dollar unilateralism has influenced some foreign 
bank dealings with North Korea, it is a less powerful strategy than in the Iran case, 
partly because North Korean banks are not as integrated into global financial 
markets.300 Furthermore, the SWIFT case demonstrates that the three tactics of 
dollar unilateralism do not always work. In that particular case, the United States 
had minimal financial leverage since SWIFT is not a traditional bank that accepts 
deposits or issues credit. High-profile blacklisting would have backfired because 
SWIFT’s reputation hangs on its commitment to data privacy and banking secrecy. 
Although direct diplomacy appears to have been effective in eliciting SWIFT’s 
support under the right circumstances, its limitations became evident once the 
intelligence operation was made public.301 
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 301. Of the three tactics, the efficacy of direct diplomacy is the most difficult to assess. 
Information about what goes on in closed-door meetings is difficult to come by. Yet, direct 
diplomacy allows for narrowly tailoring policy to each context, which may help explain 
Treasury’s enthusiasm for using it. 
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III. IMPLICATIONS 
Dollar unilateralism offers insights for both domestic and international law 
scholars working on U.S. security. It challenges the widespread assumption in 
international legal scholarship that, in the case of cross-border security threats, 
globalization has rendered unilateralism increasingly obsolete. Instead, drawing on 
lessons from the cases of Iran, North Korea, and SWIFT, I propose three conditions 
that likely influence the efficacy of harnessing foreign private actors. 
Yet even when effective, dollar unilateralism raises unresolved political 
accountability concerns, both at home and internationally. Rather than offer an 
aggregate normative assessment, I suggest the government’s precise tactics matter. 
For domestic affairs, accountability concerns are more acute when the 
government’s tactics are legally informal. By contrast, in international affairs, 
informal tactics allow for specific forms of foreign government influence and 
oversight, but favor powerful states that already have some leverage over the 
United States. These tactics, moreover, still fall short of international and 
multilateral legal processes, which are better able to secure U.S. accountability to 
weaker actors, even as they are themselves no panacea. I thus argue that dollar 
unilateralism is a powerful strategy under specific conditions, yet also opens the 
door to new accountability gaps, both domestically and internationally. 
A. Conditions for Efficacy 
The efficacy of dollar unilateralism is conditional. As before, I use a narrow 
definition of efficacy, focusing on the government’s ability to influence foreign 
banks, and foreign firms more generally.302 I highlight three factors that are likely 
to influence policy efficacy: the structure of the industry that the government seeks 
to harness; the international acceptability of the government’s policy goals that 
harnessing aims to serve; and bargaining asymmetries between the government and 
the industry targeted for harnessing. 
First, effectiveness of the government’s new unilateral strategy depends partly 
on the structure of the industry. Placed at the center of the global economy, finance 
is of primary importance to the functioning of international and national markets, 
comparable perhaps only to telecommunications and energy. Banks, for instance, 
have greater access to and influence over foreign private actors than do 
multinational corporations in manufacturing. Indeed, in the Iran case, the U.S. 
government has been able to use the centrality of the U.S. finance sector to disrupt 
two other pivotal markets: oil and insurance.303 In the banking industry, moreover, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 302. See supra text accompanying note 274. Therefore, this Part does not address a whole 
set of interesting questions related to efficacy, including the ability of the government to lift 
sanctions once imposed, the potential for foreign government retaliation against U.S. policy, 
or emulation of it, and broader questions about the efficacy of relying on targeting national 
economies (or particular sectors) as a strategy to pressure nondemocratic regimes. 
 303. See Rajendran, supra note 284, at 94–95 (noting that banking restrictions buttressed 
restrictions on both the insurance and oil sectors). For a discussion of how banking is deeply 
connected to these industries, see id. at 94–96. It is worth noting that the importance of 
industry structure depends partly on the nature of the targeted entity or regime and its own 
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sensitivity to reputational risk arguably provides a vital channel cementing further 
cross-border connections and aligning bank interests with the government’s policy 
objectives.304 Thus, even when the executive branch granted waivers to countries in 
the process of reducing their oil dependency on Iran, foreign banks still refrained 
from processing such transactions. The banks deemed both the reputational risks 
and the compliance costs too high.305 
With its extensive reach over foreign private actors, the telecommunications 
industry is also positioned at the center of the global economy. This makes 
organizations like SWIFT and telecommunications giants like Google or Verizon 
appealing targets for harnessing. Yet, as the SWIFT case illustrates, 
telecommunication companies have reputational pressures to protect consumer 
privacy that may differ from the pressure on banks, and telecommunication 
incentives can thus clash with the government’s surveillance agenda. In that case, 
direct diplomacy worked with SWIFT officials when the surveillance operation 
was covert, but became less effective once the operation was exposed. High-profile 
blacklisting of noncooperative companies will also be less likely to lead to shaming 
and tainting of the company, and more likely to backfire, pushing telecom 
companies to publicly resist U.S. harnessing efforts.306  
The acceptability of policy goals that the government seeks to advance is a 
second factor that affects the efficacy of the new U.S. unilateral strategy. When the 
United States pursues goals that are widely accepted by foreign governments and 
corporations, harnessing will be easier to implement. For instance, in contrast to its 
endorsement of U.S. policy on Iran, the European Union circumscribed the U.S. 
government’s ability to harness SWIFT. U.S. surveillance operations violate 
strongly held European privacy norms. The European Union has therefore placed 
significant pressure on the United States, forcing it, in the words of one U.S. 
official, to make “difficult” and “substantial” concessions during negotiations about 
collaboration between the United States and SWIFT.307 Under pressure from the 
European Union (and particularly the European Parliament), the United States now 
allows an E.U. official to monitor U.S. searches of encrypted data, and grants 
Europol (the European Union’s police agency) the authority to block data transfers 
from Europe to the United States.308 
                                                                                                                 
dependence on the industry. In the case of North Korea, U.S. harnessing of foreign banks 
may be less effective partly because North Korea is much less integrated into the global 
economy than most countries. 
 304. See Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo & Loriana 
Pelizzon, Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and 
Insurance Sectors, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 555 (2012). 
 305. Rajendran, supra note 284, at 94. 
 306. In response to the 2013 disclosures of telecommunication firms’ collaboration with 
NSA surveillance, for instance, U.S. companies have gone to great lengths to repair possible 
reputational damage, such as requesting the release of classified documents that may shed a 
more favorable light on their cooperation with government agencies. 
 307. SWIFT Progress? Europe Backs New EU-US Data Sharing Deal, SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(June 25, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/swift-progress-europe
-backs-new-eu-us-data-sharing-deal-a-702841.html [hereinafter SWIFT Progress?]; see also 
KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22030, U.S.-EU COOPERATION AGAINST 
TERRORISM 9–10 (2013). 
 308. SWIFT Progress?, supra note 307. The backlash following the exposure of the 
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It would be mistaken, however, to overemphasize the need for buy-in from 
foreign governments. Even when the United States goes to great lengths to secure 
the support of foreign governments,309 the primary appeal of this new form of 
unilateralism lies in one simple fact: the U.S. government does not rely on foreign 
government support to the same extent as when it proceeds by traditional bilateral 
or multilateral channels. The U.S. government’s reaction to European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) rulings invalidating E.U. designations of Iranian banks suggests this 
to be the case even in its relations with the European Union. On the same day that 
the court struck down E.U. designations on evidentiary grounds, Treasury officials 
employed financial sticks, adding six Iranian individuals and four new companies 
to its SDN list.310 
The third feature likely to influence the efficacy of harnessing involves 
market-based bargaining asymmetries between the government and individual 
foreign firms, as well as the foreign sector more generally, which the government 
seeks to enlist. The government does not simply exert uniform influence over all 
foreign banks, relying on the carrot of market access or the stick of legal sanction. 
As the “too big to prosecute” experience during the financial crisis demonstrated, 
U.S. banks are too closely intertwined with large foreign partners for the government 
to deny these partner banks market access.311 The U.S. government depends on banks 
like HSBC almost as much as such banks depend on U.S. markets. This 
interdependency constrains the government in implementing its various harnessing 
tactics. 
U.S. dominance over global finance, moreover, does not translate equally across 
all sectors. Compared to finance, for example, foreign producers are less dependent 
on the U.S. textile, energy, or even telecommunications markets. Following recent 
disclosures about the NSA’s spying program, some experts predicted that U.S. 
cloud providers would lose about ten percent of their foreign customers to 
European and Asian competitors.312 
                                                                                                                 
U.S.-SWIFT operation may foreshadow what is to come in the wake of the 2013 revelations 
of NSA spying. For example, German officials have demanded that the U.S. government 
enter into a formal agreement prohibiting future spying among allied countries. Furthermore, 
in retaliation, the European Union has threatened to cut off U.S. access to SWIFT data 
entirely and to withhold data about airline passengers. Adrian Croft, EU Threatens to 
Suspend Data-Sharing with US over Spying Reports, REUTERS, July 5, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/usa-security-eu-idUSL5N0FB1YY20130705. 
 309. See, e.g., FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 36; Mauldin, supra note 125. 
 310. Kanter, supra note 291; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Treasury Exposes Iranian 
Attempts to Evade Oil Sanctions (Sept. 6, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press
-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2158.aspx. 
 311. E.g., Greg Farrell & Tiffany Kary, Standard Chartered Still Faces Fed Probes After 
N.Y. Deal, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2012-08-14/standard-chartered-faces-fed-probes-after-n-y-deal.html. 
 312. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, The Lunacy of Trying to Avoid NSA Spying by Moving 
E-mail and Cloud out of the US, ZDNET (Aug. 27, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.zdnet.com
/the-lunacy-of-trying-to-avoid-nsa-spying-by-moving-e-mail-and-cloud-out-of-the-us
-7000019908. Other experts suggest that the losses could be even greater. E.g., Charles 
Babcock, NSA’s Prism Could Cost U.S. Cloud Companies $45 Billion, INFO. WEEK (Aug. 
15, 2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/cloud-computing/infrastructure/nsas
-prism-could-cost-us-cloud-companies/240159980. 
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Because they do not operate in isolation from one another, these three factors 
should be considered together when evaluating the potential efficacy of the 
government’s harnessing strategy. If the United States enjoys significant bargaining 
leverage over a foreign sector, it can afford to pay less attention to the international 
acceptability of its objectives than if its bargaining leverage is weak. For instance, 
U.S. attempts in the 1990s to harness foreign firms—not banks—to isolate Cuba 
were significantly undercut by E.U. opposition.313 Without E.U. support, the 
government was unable to influence foreign firms trading with Cuba. But the Cuba 
case did not simply underscore the need for E.U. backing. Rather, it demonstrated 
the importance of international support when the United States has less bargaining 
power over foreign firms. Having recognized its leverage over foreign finance, the 
United States has become less dependent on the European Union even as it 
understands the political and legitimacy benefits of E.U. support.314 
It is the interaction between these three factors, more than their independent 
effects, that is relevant for assessing the potential efficacy of this new unilateral 
strategy for addressing future transnational challenges. Regardless of where a given 
U.S. policy falls along each of these three factors and how the factors interact, the 
central point remains: despite a popular assumption that multilateral cooperation is 
necessary for addressing cross-border problems, the U.S. government’s recent turn to 
foreign banks suggests that new types of unilateralism—not just dollar unilateralism, 
but other forms too—are possible and, under certain circumstances, effective. 
B. Implications for Accountability 
Dollar unilateralism, and the specific tactics the government uses to implement 
it, raises concerns about government accountability, both within the United States 
and globally.315 I discuss these two contexts in turn. Similar to executive-private 
handshake agreements used for surveillance operations,316 informal tactics enlisting 
foreign banks create troubling accountability gaps in domestic politics. But 
domestic law scholars have expressed much less concern about informal harnessing 
of foreign firms. This silence may stem from a lack of awareness and also from the 
fact that the government has, thus far, used its tactics conservatively. Furthermore, 
Congress and the Executive have both supported dollar unilateralism in relations 
with Iran and North Korea.317 This silence is shortsighted. The tactics of dollar 
unilateralism may well evolve into a broader practice and the alignment of 
congressional-executive support may only be temporary. International law scholars 
have also been relatively quiet when it comes to evaluating dollar unilateralism, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. Supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Rajendran, supra note 284, at 98 (“Whereas the ability of the U.S. to impose 
biting trade sanctions has waned, the international role of the dollar, bolstered by the pivotal 
position of the currency within the global financial architecture, has increased the 
effectiveness of financial sanctions.”). 
 315. Accountability is only one yardstick by which to assess the government’s new 
strategy. In addition to efficacy, other dimensions include legality and legitimacy. A full 
normative assessment would need to consider these as well. 
 316. For discussion of handshake agreements, see supra text accompanying notes 38–44. 
 317. See Kittrie, supra note 9, at 789–93. 
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both as an overall strategy and in its individual tactics. The novelty of the 
government’s strategy explains this silence, as does the general, if still emerging, 
view that dollar unilateralism is valid under international law. Until assessments of 
dollar and other forms of unilateralism recognize and consider carefully the diverse 
range of unilateral tactics the government deploys—both formal and informal—they 
will remain incomplete. And even as dollar unilateralism does not appear to violate 
international law, it subverts international legal processes of participation and 
consent, creating new gaps in U.S. accountability.318 
I focus here on political accountability and adopt a definition that can be applied 
both domestically (from the perspective of the U.S. public) and internationally 
(from the perspective of other governments or their nationals). I emphasize two 
conditions: (1) accountability as managerial oversight, and (2) accountability as 
redress.319 Managerial oversight requires that an “authoritative individual or entity” 
evaluates the government’s actions and ensures that it obeys relevant rules.320 It is 
forward-looking, ongoing, and requires access to information about policy 
implementation. Redress accountability requires that an authority be able to 
penalize the government if it violates relevant rules.321 It is backward-looking and 
involves being able to sanction or seek remedy from the government for a specific 
act at a discrete point in time.322  I focus specifically on legal redress. 
Domestically, the government’s use of informal harnessing—high-profile 
blacklists and direct diplomacy—diminishes managerial and redress accountability. 
To be sure, legal formality is no guarantee of accountability. Financial sticks, 
formal both in source (congressional or regulatory actions) and form (imposing 
binding legal obligations), have nonetheless been sharply criticized for a lack of 
oversight over Treasury323 and limited access to remedy.324 Yet, even if weak in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 318. See Krisch, supra note 62, at 24–25 (discussing how the turn to informal law, 
minilateralism, and unilateralism subverts “the consensual structure of international law”). 
 319. This two-prong definition is taken from Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and 
Accountability, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101 (2011) [hereinafter Dickinson, Privatization]. 
For comprehensive discussion of the different forms of accountability, see id. at 109–11 
(defining democratic, contractual, and internal institutional accountability), and Robert O. 
Keohane, The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1121, 1130–34 (2003) (defining eight accountability mechanisms: hierarchical, 
supervisory, electoral, fiscal, legal, market, participatory, and public reputational 
accountability). For a critique of these understandings as overly broad, see Richard B. 
Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, 
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 252–55 (2014). 
 320. Dickinson, Privatization, supra note 319, at 103. 
 321. Id. 
 322. The two forms of accountability interact but are independent: redress accountability 
may have a deterrent effect and promote managerial accountability, and managerial 
accountability may encourage mechanisms of redress. Id. 
 323. E.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, 
Non-Custodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 336–44 (2014); Vanessa Ortblad, 
Comment, Criminal Prosecution in Sheep’s Clothing: The Punitive Effects of OFAC 
Freezing Sanctions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (2008). 
 324. See generally, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
AREA, THE OFAC LIST: DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES IN DESIGNATION AND DELISTING (2014) 
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practice, in theory at least, the formal nature of financial sticks provides for de jure 
mechanisms of both oversight and redress.325 
By contrast, high-profile blacklists—formal in source, but not content326—allow 
for some managerial accountability, but limited redress accountability. Section 311 
of the Patriot Act provides for ex ante accountability partly by including a list of 
jurisdictional and institutional factors that Treasury must consider when 
blacklisting an entity or region, and by requiring Treasury to issue a finding that 
describes the alleged activities of the blacklisted entity and the jurisdictional factors 
that it considered in reaching its finding.327 Treasury, moreover, is required to 
publish in the Federal Register its finding and notice of proposed rulemaking, and 
to consider comments before proceeding to use a financial stick in the form of a 
final rule that imposes special measures.328 Paradoxically, the very features that 
enhance Treasury’s managerial accountability—ensuring that Treasury’s findings 
are widely publicized and open to public scrutiny—are what constitute the act of 
blacklisting in the first place. Thus, while requirements for public scrutiny may 
increase Treasury’s accountability, they also inflict immediate damage on the 
designated entity as it comes under the public spotlight. As with financial sticks, 
section 311’s oversight mechanisms can arguably be criticized for being quite 
weak, but not for lacking such mechanisms entirely. 
The more pressing problem with high-profile backlists concerns access to 
redress.329 Even though Treasury, when blacklisting, simply names an entity 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing the limited access to remedy for entities listed as Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists). In Europe, similar critiques about lack of evidentiary basis have led the ECJ to 
invalidate a range of designations, but with little practical effect: the European Union 
redesignated banks under a broader category, making evidentiary challenges even more 
difficult. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 325. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “[a] person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 326. As a reminder, this Article defines high-profile blacklisting as the simple act of naming 
an entity though a proposed rulemaking, without the additional, optional step of imposing special 
measures though adoption of a final rule (which would be a financial stick). It is thus formal in 
source (section 311 of the Patriot Act), but not content (no legally binding obligations). 
 327. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(c) (2012). 
 328. Id. § 5318A(a)(3). Compared to that of financial sticks, the managerial accountability 
of high-profile blacklists is weaker. For instance, under section 311 of the Patriot Act, 
Treasury is not required to consult with other federal agencies at the first step of blacklisting 
an entity as a primary money-laundering concern. But the provision does mandate such 
consultations when Treasury decides to, at the second step, deploy a financial stick through 
the imposition of special measures—either at the time a proposed rulemaking is issued (for up 
to 120 days), or after a final rulemaking. Treasury must “consult with the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking 
agency, . . . the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board,” and other 
agencies the Treasury deems appropriate. Id. § 5318A(a)(4)(A). 
 329.  The relative difficulty of redress for informal actions is evident in BDA’s decision 
to file a petition alleging violations of the APA and constitutional due process only for 
Treasury’s 2007 final rule designating BDA as a primary money-laundering concern, even 
though BDA made clear in its petition that the monetary damage of Treasury’s actions 
occurred following its 2005 blacklisting, two years before the final rule was issued. Its 
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without adopting a final rule, U.S. and foreign banks have been quick to cut off ties 
with the blacklisted bank. Without Treasury formally requiring them to do so (as in 
the case of financial sticks), it is more difficult for a blacklisted bank (or its 
business partner) to obtain legal redress and repair its reputation for two reasons: 
(1) the blacklisted bank (or its business partners) may have a harder time 
establishing that it has been harmed, and that Treasury caused the harm, than if 
Treasury had required banks to cut business ties by issuing a final rule;330 and (2) 
the blacklisted entity may have a harder time getting equitable relief, as it cannot 
ask courts to invalidate the final rule since no final rule was issued.331 By contrast, 
with a formal obligation requiring U.S. entities to cut ties, a blacklisted entity can 
request that a court invalidate Treasury’s final rule. It can thus use the court to send 
a signal that it has been unjustifiably turned into a “financial pariah.”332 
From the perspective of political accountability, direct diplomacy is more 
problematic than high-profile blacklists since its informal nature in source and 
content makes the achievement of both managerial and redress accountability 
particularly difficult. In contrast to financial sticks and high-profile blacklists, no 
formal laws or regulations detail the jurisdictional or institutional factors that 
Treasury must consider when engaging in direct diplomacy. There are no 
requirements that Treasury announce that it is holding meetings, much less disclose 
the content of the meetings, and no opportunities for public feedback or 
commentary. Additionally, since Treasury does not impose legal obligations on 
foreign banks when it conducts direct diplomacy, there is no basis for formal 
redress either, whether by an entity that is targeted by Treasury for participating in 
such meetings, or by an entity that is the topic of such meetings. 
Dollar unilateralism also presents important challenges to U.S. managerial and 
redress accountability at the global level. The traits that make these tactics so 
appealing for the U.S. government render them problematic internationally: they 
enable the United States to circumvent traditional international and multilateral 
legal processes of participation and consent, such as those at the U.N.333 To be sure, 
one could defend the government’s tactics on grounds that they are valid under 
                                                                                                                 
petition focused on the final rule most likely because proving injury and obtaining equitable 
relief is easier with Treasury’s formal action. See Complaint ¶ 33, Banco Delta Asia, 
S.A.R.L. v. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, No. 1:13-cv-00333 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2013). 
 330. To establish standing, the blacklisted entity must demonstrate that it was harmed and 
that the agency caused the harmful actions of the third party. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 
59, 78 (1978). Courts are cautious to hold agencies accountable for “the unfettered choices 
made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate 
discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 
(quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Although a blacklisted entity may have indeed suffered injury by a third-party bank, 
this harm was triggered due to the Treasury’s preliminary finding and proposed rulemaking. 
Because Treasury had yet to take any final action against the blacklisted entity, it may have a 
more difficult time establishing that it has been harmed because of Treasury’s action. 
 331. Standing also requires that the injury be redressable by the relief sought. Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 561. 
 332. ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR, supra note 118, at 53; see also supra Part II.B. 
 333. This move away from international legal processes is part of a broader trend among 
states. See generally Krisch, supra note 62. 
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international law in both substance and procedure.334 Although intended to 
influence foreign private actors, the U.S. government’s use of financial sticks is 
based on territorial connections and does not clearly contravene jurisdictional 
rules.335 International law, moreover, does not prohibit governments from simply 
naming foreign entities as posing criminal risks, nor does it forbid governments 
from launching systematic diplomacy campaigns with foreign private actors, either 
at home or abroad. One could further point to substantial international and 
multilateral support for U.S. policy on Iran and North Korea.336 The U.N. Security 
Council, for instance, has arguably implicitly authorized governments to take such 
measures against these two countries.337 
But it would be mistaken to equate the legality of the U.S. policies and the presence 
of multilateral support with political accountability. International legality is neither 
“the final arbiter of legitimacy”338 nor the uncompromising guarantor of 
accountability. Even conceding its legality under international law, the U.S. 
government’s avoidance of international multilateral procedures limits managerial and 
redress accountability, albeit to varying degrees. Different from the domestic context, 
tactics that are legally formal in source—financial sticks and high-profile blacklists—
weaken the government’s managerial accountability in the international context: 
foreign governments are ill positioned to evaluate, much less to influence, ex ante U.S. 
legislative and regulatory processes that seek to deploy foreign banks for national 
security purposes, except when the U.S. government invites them into the process. 
Informal tactics, by contrast, allow for at least some managerial accountability 
since the Executive has more flexibility in deciding whether, when, and how to 
implement its policy. With direct diplomacy, for instance, the U.S. government has 
generally engaged foreign government officials, requesting their permission to hold 
                                                                                                                 
 
 334. Some might suggest that U.S. economic restrictions violate WTO law, but others could 
point to the national security exception. See Shailja Singh, WTO Compatibility of United 
States’ Secondary Sanctions Relating to Petroleum Transactions with Iran 2–4 (Ctr. for WTO 
Studies, Working Paper No. CWS/WP/200/1, 2012), available at 
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf. 
 335. While some nonetheless consider U.S. policies extraterritorial, see, e.g., Alex Lakatos 
& Jan Blöchliger, The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Finance Laws, 3 GESKR 
344 (2009) (Ger.), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/bc828278-
4516-41ea-bc07-5cbcf909be56/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6746390a-c4f7-46fe-afb3
-0a9b3cc7cccb/05_Lakatos_Bloechliger.pdf, the U.S. government refutes this position. As 
David Cohen, Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated in a 
2014 interview, “None of our authorities are extraterritorial. They all operate on U.S. 
institutions and U.S. persons and activity in the United States.” Mauldin, supra note 125. 
 336. See Krisch, supra note 62, at 23 (noting that the U.S. government’s use of financial 
sticks “could raise concerns on jurisdictional grounds . . . [y]et the permissive regime of 
Financing Convention and SC resolutions, coupled with favourable political circumstances, 
seems to have led to widespread acquiescence”). 
 337. This view would be consistent with the notion of “channeled unilateralism,” in 
which the multilateral system uses unilateralism as an enforcement mechanism for 
international law. Supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 338. Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents, supra note 63, at 393. 
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meetings with foreign bank executives.339 In theory, foreign officials can prohibit 
such meetings on their territory or insist on being present. 
Although at the global level the United States is generally more accountable for 
its informal rather than formal tactics, this accountability is still weaker than the 
managerial accountability that can be established by multilateral institutions, 
despite the fact that these institutions have important accountability gaps of their 
own.340 At multilateral venues such as the U.N. and the FATF, foreign governments 
may question and evaluate U.S. proposals; in response the United States must, at 
minimum, articulate a rationale for its policies, justify its selection of targets, and 
engage in bargaining and debate.341 By contrast, when dealing with dollar 
unilateralism, foreign governments may be able to influence U.S. tactics only in a 
piecemeal and ad hoc fashion. Their ability to do so, moreover, will be a function of 
leverage over the United States: powerful states may be able to push back on U.S. 
tactics, while weaker states will be hard pressed to resist. When powerful states 
support dollar unilateralism, the mechanisms for U.S. accountability globally become 
even more elusive. While scholars and policymakers may be reassured by E.U.-U.S. 
alignment on foreign policy issues, from the perspective of weaker states, E.U.-U.S. 
alignment likely renders the possibility of accountability ever more remote. 
Compared to accountability established at the U.N., redress accountability in the 
United States is also limited, for both foreign nationals and foreign governments. 
Redress for foreign entities is particularly difficult with respect to the government’s 
informal tactics. But its formal tactics also are relatively difficult to challenge. By 
contrast, the U.N. Security Council, for all its limitations,342 has responded to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 339. See FEAVER & LORBER, supra note 14, at 28. 
 340. For scholarship discussing accountability gaps of multilateral institutions, see 
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public criticism by attempting to improve access to remedy to those injured by its 
sanctions policies.343 And compared to the United States, the U.N. has gone to 
significantly greater lengths in implementing reforms.344 Foreign governments 
could conceivably file claims at the WTO or International Court of Justice against 
the United States, but since U.S. tactics are not in clear violation of international 
law, such action would be unlikely to get very far. 
The perceived legality of U.S. tactics and widespread support for U.S. goals of 
isolating Iran and North Korea and tracking illicit financial flows may be, 
paradoxically, the greatest barrier to U.S. political accountability, both domestically 
and internationally. Criticism has been scarce, and the United States has not had to 
defend its methods—despite the fact that some actors are now paying a very heavy 
humanitarian price,345 and that such methods would likely be viewed as deeply 
troubling if implemented on a broad scale. 
This discussion of weak U.S. accountability is not a pollyannaish call for 
discarding dollar unilateralism, an innovative and powerful strategy. Rather it 
highlights an urgent need to debate and perhaps institutionalize procedures that 
mitigate emerging gaps in U.S. accountability in both domestic and global 
contexts.346 While calls for accountability, for other issues, may well be “ever-
present mantras,”347 and “all the rage,”348 in the case of dollar unilateralism, they 
are far too rare. And while public debate is hardly an answer, it is a first step both 
for engaging the government about dollar unilateralism and for evaluating the need 
to establish new mechanisms that provide some form of oversight. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has effected a profound shift in its national 
security strategy: it has harnessed foreign banks in the pursuit of vital security 
goals. This shift introduces “dollar unilateralism” as a new mode for projecting 
U.S. power. Dollar unilateralism raises questions about how the government enlists 
foreign banks, especially those with weak or no ties to U.S. markets. Drawing on 
examples such as Iran’s nuclear weapon policies, the Article argues that the U.S. 
government has used its central position in global finance to enlist foreign banks in 
its effort to isolate targeted entities and track illicit financial flows. Relying on the 
special status of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, the government has 
deployed three novel formal and informal legal tactics: financial sticks, high-profile 
blacklists, and direct diplomacy. Dollar unilateralism is effective under three 
conditions related to industry structure, policy acceptability, and bargaining 
asymmetry. Ultimately, dollar unilateralism challenges a widespread assumption 
about the increasing necessity of multilateral cooperation and raises new concerns 
about the government’s political accountability, both domestically and globally. 
  

